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Abstract
We distinguish two notions of substitutes for discrete inputs of a ﬁrm. Class
substitutes are deﬁned assuming that units of a given input have the same price
while unitary substitutes treat each unit as a distinct input with its own price. Uni-
tary substitutes is necessary and suﬃcient for such results as the robust existence of
equilibrium, the robust inclusion of the Vickrey outcome in the core, and the law of
aggregate demand, while the class substitutes condition is necessary and suﬃcient
for robust monotonicity of certain auction/tˆ atonnement processes. We analyze the
concept of pseudo-equilibrium which extends, and in some sense approximates, the
concept of equilibrium when no equilibrium exists. We characterize unitary sub-
stitutes as class substitutes plus two other properties. We extend the analysis to
divisible inputs, with a particular focus on robustness of the concepts and their
relation to the generalized law of aggregate demand.
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11 Introduction
The notion of substitute inputs expresses the idea that when the price of one type of
input rises, the number of units demanded of the other inputs cannot fall. But what
are “types” of inputs? If electricity generated at locations A and B are perfectly sub-
stitutable in production, should we regard these as one class of input or two? It turns
out that important results of price theory and multi-unit auction theory hinge on the
way such questions are answered. When substitute comparisons only apply across dis-
tinct classes of goods, we will say that the ﬁrm has a class-substitute valuation. If even
units of the same class of good are substitutes when priced independently, we will say
that the ﬁrm has a unitary-substitute valuation. The biggest surprises in our analysis
are that even in very ordinary-looking problems, identical inputs may fail to be substi-
tutes for one another and that this failure is consequential for standard economic analysis.
We illustrate this point with simple examples. Suppose that the price of output is one
and that the amount f of output produced by a ﬁrm as a function of two types of discrete
inputs x ∈ {0,1} and y ∈ {0,1,2} is:
f y = 0 y = 1 y = 2
x = 0 0 1
√
2
x = 1 1 1
√
2
f is submodular in its two arguments and has nonincreasing marginal returns.1 The ﬁrm
chooses x and y to maximize f(x,y) − rx − wy. Since the function f is submodular, the
inputs x and y are substitutes. Substitutes means that when comparing any two price
vectors p and p0 for which the ﬁrm’s optimum is unique, if p ≥ p0 and pi = p0
i, then the
demand for good i is weakly higher at prices p.
Next, consider a formulation in which the two units of input y are treated as distinct.
Let y = y1 + y2 and suppose y1,y2 ∈ {0,1}. In this formulation, the prices are also
1It is easy to see that functionally identical inputs can fail to be substitutes for one another in the
usual sense of price theory when there are increasing marginal returns to that type of input. In order to
be clear that this is not what underlies our example, we chose f with nonincreasing marginal returns.
2potentially distinct, so the ﬁrm maximizes f(x,y1 + y2) − rx − w1y1 − w2y2. It is as
if we had distinguished blue and red versions of the input, where the color is devoid
of any consequences for production. It is easy to check that if the input prices are
(r,w1,w2) = (0.2,0.3,0.2), then the ﬁrm’s unique proﬁt-maximizing input vector is (0,1,1),
but if (r,w1,w2) = (0.2,0.3,0.7), then the proﬁt-maximizing choice is (1,0,0). This demon-
strates that an increase in the price of input y2 reduces the demand for input y1: diﬀerent
units of the same type of good may fail to be substitutes.
Examples of this sort are hardly rare. For instance, an airline that is acquiring landing
slots at a hub airport may wish to have some number N of slots, for illustration N=2,
within a particular period, say from 2:00pm to 2:15pm or from 3:00pm to 3:15pm. The
two periods deﬁne class substitutes: if slots at 2-2:15 are expensive, the airline may sub-
stitute slots at 3-3:15. Slots within a given time period, however, are not substitutes: the
airline wants both or neither.
One important distinction between class and unitary substitutes arises when studying the
question of whether market-clearing prices exist. Using models in which goods are priced
individually, Gul and Stacchetti (1999) and Milgrom (2000), establish that when goods
are substitutes, market-clearing prices always exist. Moreover, they display monotonic
auction processes that converge to these market-clearing prices. In those formulations,
substitutes means unitary substitutes: the results do not extend to the case of class sub-
stitutes. For suppose that good y is treated as a single class and that the available supply
for the two classes of goods is given by the vector (1,2). Suppose that ﬁrm 1 has valuation
f as before, and that there is a second ﬁrm with unit valuation g(x,y) = 1y≥1. At the
eﬃcient allocation, ﬁrm 2 uses one unit of y and ﬁrm 1 uses one unit of x. To induce
ﬁrm 1 to make this choice, the price of input y must be strictly positive, but then ﬁrm 1
will strictly prefer not to buy any units of input y and ﬁrm 2 will strictly prefer to buy
exactly one unit. Hence, there will be a strict excess supply of y: no market clearing
prices exist.
If the supply vector is anything else besides (1,2) in this example with only class substi-
tutes, then not only does a market clearing price vector exist, but more is true. First,
the set of market clearing price vectors is a sublattice. Second, a continuous tˆ atonnement
or clock auction process beginning with low prices converges monotonically upward to
the minimum market clearing price vector. A similar process beginning with high prices
converges monotonically downward to the maximum market clearing price vector.
3How does the clock auction perform when there are no market clearing prices? Suppose
that ﬁrm 1 has valuation f as above, ﬁrm 2 has valuation v(x,y) = .05 × 1y≥1, supply
is (1,1) and we initially set the input price vector to (0,0). At that price there is strict
excess demand for good y but not for good x. The price of good y is gradually increased.
When py becomes greater than .05, ﬁrm 2’s demand drops to 0 units of good y. Even-
tually, the price reaches a level py at which the ﬁrm 1 is indiﬀerent between buying one
unit of x or two units of y and ﬁrm 2 is indiﬀerent between 0 and 1 unit of good x (since
px = 0). The indiﬀerence equation is 1 =
√
2 − 2py, so py = (
√
2 − 1)/2. When the clock
reaches py, ﬁrm 1 demands either 1 unit of x or two units of y. Consequently demand is
strictly less or strictly more than supply for good y. At price (0,py), aggregate demand
consists of the bundles (2,1), (2,0), (0,1) and (0,2), thus contains the supply (1,1) in its
convex hull. We deﬁne2 such a situation where supply is in the convex hull of aggregate
demand as a pseudo-equilibrium. In this example, there is no equilibrium and the clock
auction terminates at the minimum pseudo-equilibrium price vector.
Examples of this sort are potentially signiﬁcant for the design of activity rules in auctions.
At prices (px,p1,p2) = (.4,.4,.41), ﬁrm 1 demands (x,y1,y2) = (0,1,1) while at prices
(px,p1,p2) = (.4,.5,.41), ﬁrm 1 demands (x,y1,y2) = (1,0,0). Suppose these two price
vectors represent successive prices in an ascending auction and that the next price vector
is (.5,.5,.41). The ﬁrm’s demand now shifts to (0,1,1): its total demand rises from 1 unit
to 2 units. Hatﬁeld and Milgrom (2004) had shown that the unitary substitutes property
implies that a proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm satisﬁes the law of aggregate demand: as prices rise,
total demand (i.e. the sum of quantities demanded across all goods) does not increase.
Activity rules for ascending auctions with or without clocks typically require that the
demand expressed during an auction must satisfy that property,3 and our example shows
that such rules can block straightforward bidding when goods are class substitutes (but
not when they are unitary substitutes).
These observations herald more general results, which are the subject of this paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deﬁnes class-substitute
valuations, based on a multi-unit formulation of the economy, and unitary-substitute
valuations, based on a binary formulation. Section 3 characterizes class-substitute and
2In fact, such property is equivalent to our deﬁnition of pseudo-equilibrium. See Deﬁnition 11.
3An exception is the revealed-preference activity rule of Ausubel and Milgrom (2002).
4unitary-substitute valuations in terms of the ﬁrm’s dual proﬁt function. The dual charac-
terization adds transparency to some of our central results. Section 4 further analyzes the
concepts of substitutes and their relations. Gul and Stacchetti had shown that unitary
substitutes is equivalent to a certain single-improvement property deﬁned using nonlin-
ear prices. We show that it is also equivalent to a similar property deﬁned using only
linear prices. We demonstrate that unitary substitutes is equivalent to class substitutes
plus two additional conditions. We also show that, while the law of aggregate demand
may fail with class substitutes, it always holds when an additional assumption is made,
which we call the consecutive-integer property. Section 5 considers the implications of
class and unitary substitutes for aggregate demand. We show that the unitary substi-
tutes condition is suﬃcient and necessary (in a quantiﬁed sense) for the robust existence
of market-clearing prices. We show that the class substitutes condition implies that the
set of pseudo-equilibrium price vectors is a non-empty sublattice and that this set coin-
cides with the set of equilibrium prices whenever an equilibrium exists. We show that the
unitary-substitutes is a suﬃcient and, in a similar quantiﬁed sense, necessary condition
for Vickrey payoﬀs to be in the core.
Section 6 presents our analysis of clock auctions when bidders have class-substitute val-
uations. We introduce a continuous model to represent clock auctions with small bid
increments. We ﬁrst show that class substitutes is necessary and suﬃcient for the mono-
tonicity of a certain tˆ atonnement-like clock auction and that continuous descending or
ascending clock auctions always terminate at a pseudo-equilibrium. In one version of the
clock auction model, the auction terminates at the smallest pseudo-equilibrium price.
Section 7 presents further properties of pseudo-equilibria, elaborating on the idea that
they are approximate equilibria when equilibria do not exist.
Section 8 extends the analysis to divisible goods. We show that for the case of divisible
goods and concave valuations, a natural extension of unitary substitutes coincides with
class substitutes. In that case, the law of aggregate demand and its unit-free extensions
generally fail. Thus, for concave valuations, the law of aggregate demand characterizes
the diﬀerence between the cases of discrete goods and divisible goods.
Section 9 concludes.
52 Deﬁnitions




˜ X = Πk∈K{0,1}
Nk
represent the space of possible bundles of the exchange economy in its multi-unit and bi-
nary formulations. The obvious correspondence between these formulations is represented
by the function φ : ˜ X into X. Formally,




Definition 1 (Multi-Unit Valuation) A multi-unit valuation v is a mapping from
X into R.
Definition 2 (Binary Valuation) A binary valuation ˜ v is a mapping from ˜ X into R.
The binary valuation ˜ v corresponds to the multi-unit valuation v, if for every ˜ x, ˜ v(˜ x) =
v(ϕ(˜ x)). We denote by V the space of multi-unit valuations and ˜ V the space of corre-
sponding binary valuations. Similarly, P = RK
+ and ˜ P = Πk∈KR
Nk
+ denote the respective
price spaces of the multi-unit and binary economies. The ﬁrst space formulation permits
only linear prices for each category of goods, while the second space eﬀectively allows non-
linear prices for each type of good separately, with the marginal price for each good weakly
increasing. Throughout the paper, we assume that agents have quasi-linear utilities.
Assumption 1 (Quasi-linearity) The utility of an agent with multi-unit valuation v
acquiring a bundle x at price p is
u(x,p) = v(x) − px.
Similarly, the utility of an agent with binary valuation ˜ v acquiring a bundle ˜ x at price ˜ p
is
˜ u(˜ x, ˜ p) = ˜ v(˜ x) − ˜ p˜ x.
Given a binary valuation ˜ v and a price vector ˜ p ∈ ˜ P, deﬁne the demand function of the
agent at price ˜ p by
˜ D(˜ p) = argmax
˜ x∈ ˜ X
{˜ v(˜ x) − ˜ p˜ x}.




With quasi-linear preferences, there is no distinction to be made between gross and net
substitutes, so we drop the modiﬁer and make the following deﬁnitions.
Definition 3 (Unitary-Substitute Valuation) A multi-unit valuation v is a unitary-
substitute valuation if its binary form ˜ v satisﬁes the binary substitutes property: for any




kj ≥ ˜ xkj
for all (k,j) such that ˜ pkj = ˜ qkj.
Definition 4 (Class-Substitute Valuation) A multi-unit valuation v is a class-
substitute valuation if it satisﬁes the multi-unit substitutes property: for all prices p




for all k in K = {κ ∈ K : pκ = qκ}.
The unitary substitutes condition is at least weakly more restrictive than the class substi-
tutes condition, because the latter applies only for linear prices while the former applies
also for nonlinear prices. Moreover, the class substitutes condition only compares units
of distinct goods, while the unitary substitutes condition requires that units of the same
good be substitutes. Section 1 illustrates the limits of class-substitute valuations. In
particular, class-substitute valuations may violate the law of aggregate demand.
3 Duality Results
To any multi-unit valuation v we associate the dual proﬁt function π : P → R such that
π(p) = max
x∈X
{u(x,p) = v(x) − px}.
Similarly, to any binary valuation ˜ v we associate the dual proﬁt function
˜ π(˜ p) = max
˜ x∈ ˜ X
{˜ u(˜ x, ˜ p) = ˜ v(˜ x) − ˜ p˜ x}.
We will use the following result.
7Definition 5 (Multi-Unit Concavity) A multi-unit valuation is concave if it can be
extended to a concave function on RK.
Theorem 1 Let v be a multi-unit valuation and π be its dual proﬁt function. Then, for




Moreover, v is concave if and only if
v(x) = min
p∈P
{π(p) + px} (1)
for all x ∈ X.
Proof. The ﬁrst claim follows from the deﬁnition of π. The second claim is proved by
applying the separating-hyperplane theorem. 
Ausubel’s and Milgrom’s dual characterization of unitary substitute valuations extends
straightforwardly to the cases treated here.
Theorem 2 (Ausubel and Milgrom (2002)) v is a class-substitute valuation if and
only if π is submodular, and these hold if and only if the dual proﬁt function ˜ π of its
binary form ˜ v = φ(v) is submodular on the restricted domain where goods of the same
type have equal prices. In addition, v is a unitary-substitute valuation if and only if the
dual proﬁt function ˜ π of its binary form ˜ v = φ(v) is submodular.
Proof. The proofs of the two statements follow the proof of Theorem 10 in Ausubel and
Milgrom (2002). 
One can alternatively characterize class substitutes using the larger price space ˜ P of the
binary formulation. The relevant multi-unit prices are expressed in that formulation by
the subset PL of ˜ P in which goods of the same type have the same price. This subset
is isomorphic to the set P of linear prices used in the multi-unit economy. The class-
substitute property then corresponds to the requirement that the dual proﬁt function
is submodular on PL, while the unitary-substitute property requires submodularity on
the whole price space. An immediate consequence of this alternative formulation is the
following:
Theorem 3 Any unitary-substitute valuation is also a class-substitute valuation.
8The converse is not true. For example, suppose there is only one type of good, so that
every valuation v is a class-substitute valuation. Let v(0) = 0, v(1) = 1 and v(2) = 3
and suppose prices are (p1,p2) = (1.4,1.4), at which both units are demanded. Increasing
p1 to 1.7 would reduce demand to 0, thus violating the unitary-substitute property. The
same example establishes that a multi-unit valuation can be submodular even when the
related binary valuation is not.
We have seen than class-substitute valuations need not be submodular. The following
result shows that adding the requirement that v is concave does yield submodularity.
Theorem 4 Any concave class-substitute valuation is submodular.
Proof. From Theorem 1, we have
v(x) = min
p∈P
{π(p) + px} = max
p {−π(p) − px}.
From Theorem 2, π is submodular. Therefore, v is the maximum over p of a function that
is supermodular in p and −x, which implies that v is supermodular in −x or, equivalently,
submodular in x. 
Theorem 5 Let ˜ v be a unitary-substitute valuation. Then,
˜ v(˜ x) = min
˜ p∈ ˜ P
{˜ π(˜ p) + ˜ p˜ x}
Proof. Given ˜ x, deﬁne ˜ p as ˜ pa = 0 if ˜ xa = 1 and ˜ pa = ∞ if ˜ xa = 0. Clearly, ˜ x ∈ ˜ D(˜ p).
The rest of the proof is identical to the proof of Theorem 1. 
Underlying Theorem 4 is the fact that concavity allows v to be expressed by formula (1).
As Theorem 5 shows, concavity is not required in the binary form to obtain that equation,
which oﬀers a way to understand why unitary substitutes implies submodularity.
4 Relations between Concepts of Substitutes
Gul and Stacchetti (1999) introduce the single-improvement property for binary valuations
and show that it is equivalent to the substitutes property, as follows.
9Definition 6 (Binary Single-Improvement Property) A binary valuation ˜ v sat-
isﬁes the single-improvement property if for any price vector ˜ p and ˜ x / ∈ ˜ D(˜ p), there exists
˜ y such that u(˜ y, ˜ p) > u(˜ x, ˜ p),
k(˜ y − ˜ x)+k1 ≤ 1,
and
k(˜ x − ˜ y)+k1 ≤ 1.
Theorem 6 (Gul and Stacchetti (1999)) A monotonic valuation is a unitary-substitute
valuation if and only if it satisﬁes the binary single-improvement property.
We now extend these results to multi-unit economies.
Definition 7 (Multi-Unit Single-Improvement Property) A valuation v satis-
ﬁes the multi-unit single-improvement property if for any p and x / ∈ D(p), there exists x0
such that u(x0,p) > u(x,p),
k(x




The only diﬀerence in the deﬁnitions of binary and multi-unit single-improvement prop-
erties therefore resides in the price domain where the property has to hold.
Throughout the paper, we will denote by ek the vector of RK whose kth component equals
one and whose other components equal zero.
Theorem 7 If v satisﬁes the multi-unit single-improvement property then it is a class-
substitute valuation.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that the class-substitute property is violated: there
exist p, k, a small positive constant ε, and a bundle x such that x ∈ D(p) and for all
y ∈ D(p + εek), there exists j 6= k such that yj < xj. Set ˆ p = p + εek. We have x / ∈ D(ˆ p)
and yk < xk for all y ∈ D(ˆ p) (since D(p) clearly contains bundles with strictly less than
xk units of good k). Therefore x is only dominated by bundles y that have strictly less
units of at least two goods, implying that k(x − y)+k1 ≥ 2, which violates the single-
improvement property. 
The converse in not true, as we now illustrate.
4Here the norm is deﬁned on RK, whereas it was deﬁned on R
P
k Nk in the binary setting.
10Counter-Example 1 There exist class-substitute valuation that do not satisfy the multi-
unit single-improvement property.
Proof. In the ﬁrst example of Section 1, the valuation is submodular in a two-good econ-
omy, thus satisﬁes the class substitutes property. However, for r = 0.2 and w = 0.3, the
bundle (1,0) is only dominated by the bundle (0,2), which violates the single-improvement
property. 
Definition 8 (Multi-Unit Submodularity) A multi-unit valuation v is submodular
if for any vectors x and x0 of X
v(x) + v(x
0) ≥ v(x ∧ x
0) + v(x ∨ x
0)
For completeness, we record as a theorem that submodularity of a binary valuation implies
the same property in the corresponding multi-unit valuation. In fact, by an argument
similar to the one in the duality section, one can show that submodularity of the multi-
unit valuation is equivalent to submodularity of the binary valuation on a restricted
subspace of the valuation space.
Theorem 8 Let v be a multi-unit valuation. If the binary valuation ˜ v = φ(v) is submod-
ular, then v is submodular.
We have seen earlier that the reverse implication is not true. It is well known that when
the economy only has two divisible goods and the valuation is concave, submodularity
of v is equivalent to the substitutes property. It is also well known that the extreme
points of a demand set are unchanged when one replaces v with its concave hull (i.e. the
smallest concave function above v). The following theorem takes these observations one
step farther.
Theorem 9 Suppose that v is a 2-good valuation and ˆ v is its concave hull. Then v is a
class-substitute valuation if and only if ˆ v is submodular.
Proof. We have
ˆ v(x) = min
p {π(p) + px} = −max
p g(p,x)
where g(p,x) = −π(p)−px. v is a class-substitute valuation if and only if π is submodular.
In that case, g is supermodular in (p1,p2,−x1,−x2). A theorem by Topkis (1998) then
implies that maxp g is supermodular in x so ˆ v is submodular in x. For the reverse direction,
we have
π(p) = max
x {ˆ v(x) + px} = max
x h(x,p).
11If ˆ v is submodular, h is supermodular in (x1,−x2,p1,−p2). The same theorem then im-
plies that π is supermodular in (p1,−p2) or, equivalently, submodular in (p1,p2). 
The next theorem contains a key result for the existence of Walrasian equilibria in multi-
unit economies. The proof, as well as other theorems whose conclusions involve concavity
of v, uses Gul and Stacchetti’s characterization theorem (Theorem 6) and thus requires
monotonicity of v. Throughout the rest of the paper, we assume that v is nondecreasing.
Assumption 2 Agent valuations are nondecreasing.
Theorem 10 If v is a unitary-substitute valuation, then any bundle x is optimal at some
linear price.
Proof. Let x be any bundle, and ˜ x be a binary representation of this bundle. From5
Theorem 5, we have
v(x) = ˜ v(˜ x) = min
˜ p
{˜ π(˜ p) + ˜ p˜ x}. (2)
Moreover, from Theorem 17, the set M of minimizers of the right-hand side of (2) is a
complete lattice. In particular, it has a largest element ˜ p. We claim that this element is
a linear price on the support of ˜ x. That is, for any good k such that xk ≥ 1, ˜ pki = ˜ pkj
whenever ˜ xki = ˜ xkj = 1. Suppose by contradiction that ˜ pki 6= ˜ pkj for some units i, j of
some good k such that ˜ xki = ˜ xkj = 1. Then the price vector ˜ p0 equal to ˜ p except for units
i and j of good k, where ˜ pki and ˜ pkj are swapped, is also a minimizer of (2). Therefore
˜ p ∨ ˜ p0 > ˜ p is also in M, which contradicts maximality of ˜ p. We have thus shown that ˜ p
is linear on the support of ˜ x: for each good k there exists a price pk such that ˜ pki = pk
for all i such that ˜ xki = 1. Obviously, ˜ pkl = +∞ whenever ˜ xkl = 0. For any good k
such that xk ∈ {1,Nk − 1}, the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent, at ˜ p, between x and some bundle yk
such that yk
k < xk, otherwise it would be possible to increase pk, which would contradict
maximality of ˜ p. We can choose yk so that it is optimal if we slightly increase the price of
some particular unit of good k. Since ˜ v is a unitary substitute valuation, we can choose
y such that yk
k = xk − 1, and yk
j ≥ xj for all j. Since ˜ pkl = +∞ outside of the support of
˜ x, we necessarily have yk
j = xj for j 6= k. Therefore we exactly have
y
k = x − ek.
Such indiﬀerence bundles exist for all goods k such that 1 ≤ xk ≤ Nk − 1.
5As the reader can easily verify, Theorems 5 and 17 are independent of this proof.
12We now prove that x is optimal for the linear price vector p = (pk)k∈K, where pk = +∞
when xk = 0, pk = 0 when xk = Nk, and pk is deﬁned as above when 1 ≤ xk ≤ Nk − 1.
That is, we can impose ˜ pkl = pk for all units, including those for which ˜ xkl = 0, and
preserve optimality of x. For all goods such that xk ∈ [1,Nk − 1], reset all unit prices
outside the support of ˜ x from +∞ to pk. This change does not aﬀect optimality of x
among bundles z such that z ≤ x, and it does not aﬀect indiﬀerence between x and the
bundles yk. For any good k, consider the bundle zk = x + ek. Since ˜ v is submodular,
Theorem 13 implies that v is component-wise concave (see p. 16). Therefore,
v(z
k) − v(x) ≤ v(x) − v(y
k) = pk,
which implies that zk is weakly dominated by x. Now for two goods k 6= j such that
xk ≥ 1 and xj < Nj, consider the bundle zkj = x − ek + ej. We claim that z is also
weakly dominated by x. To see this, we use the following Lemma, whose proof is in the
Appendix.6
Lemma 1 If v is a unitary-substitute valuation, k and j are two goods and x is a bundle
such that xk ≤ Nk − 1 and xj ≤ Nj − 2, then
v(x + ek + ej) − v(x + ek) ≥ v(x + 2ej) − v(x + ej).





which implies, since v(x) = v(yj) + pj = v(yk) + pk, that
v(x) − pk ≥ v(z
kj) − pj,
and thus that x weakly dominates z. We have thus proved that ˜ x has no single improve-
ment. From Theorem 6, ˜ v satisﬁes the single-improvement property. Therefore, ˜ x must
be optimal at the linear price ˜ p such that ˜ pkl = pk for all l ∈ {1,...,Nk}. Equivalently,
the bundle x is optimal at price p = (pk), which concludes the proof. 
We can now state the properties of unitary-substitute valuations in linear-pricing economies.
Theorem 11 Suppose that v is a unitary-substitute valuation. Then it satisﬁes the fol-
lowing properties:
6As can be easily checked, the proof of Lemma 1 is independent of the proof of the present theorem.
13[Concavity] v is concave.
[Class-Substitute Property.] For any p ∈ P, k ∈ K, ε > 0, and x ∈ D(p), there exists
x0 ∈ D(p + εek) such that
x
0
j ≥ xj for all j 6= k.
[Law of Aggregate Demand.] For any p ∈ P, k ∈ K, ε > 0, and x ∈ D(p), there exists
x0 ∈ D(p + εek) such that
kx
0k1 ≤ kxk1.
[Consecutive-Integer Property.] For any p ∈ P and k ∈ K, the set
Dk(p) = {zk : z ∈ D(p)}
consists of consecutive integers.
Proof. Theorem 3 implies that v satisﬁes the class-substitute property, and Hatﬁeld
and Milgrom (2004) show that v must satisfy the law of aggregate demand. Therefore, it
remains to show that v is concave and satisﬁes the consecutive-integer property.
We ﬁrst show that v is concave. Theorem 10 implies that for any x there exists p such
that
π(p) = v(x) − px,
where π is the dual proﬁt function deﬁned in Section 3. From the ﬁrst part of Theorem 1,
v(x) ≤ min
p π(p) + px.
Combining the two equations above yields
v(x) = min
p π(p) + px,
for all x. Applying the second part of Theorem 1 then proves that v is concave.7
Last, we show the consecutive-integer property. Suppose by contradiction that there exist
p, k, and two bundles x and y in D(p) such that xk ≥ yk+2 and z ∈ D(p) ⇒ zk / ∈ (yk,xk).
Consider the binary price vector ˜ p that is linear and equal to pj for all good j 6= k, and
that equals pk for the ﬁrst xk units of good k and +∞ for the remaining units of good k.
Clearly, there exist binary forms ˜ x and ˜ y of x and y that belong to ˜ D(˜ p), and there is
7As can be easily veriﬁed, the proof of Theorem 1 is independent of the present proof.
14no bundle ˜ z in ˜ D(˜ p) such that zk ∈ (yk,xk). If the price of one unit of good k is slightly
increased, the demand for good k thus falls directly below zk, implying that the demand
of another unit of good k, whose price had not increased, has strictly decreased, which
violates the unitary-substitute property for ˜ v. 
The consecutive-integer property is not implied by concavity of v. For example, in a
(multi-unit) two-good economy, concavity is compatible with the demand set D(p) =
{(1,0),(0,2)}. However, this demand set violates the consecutive-integer property: the
set D2(p) = {0,2} does not consist of consecutive integers. The consecutive-integer
property rules out valuations causing a sudden decrease in the consumption of a good
(independently of the consumption of other goods). For example, there are no prices at
which the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between bundles containing, say, 5 and 10 units of a good,
but strictly prefers these bundles to any bundle containing between 6 and 9 units of that
good. In that sense, there are no “holes” in the demand set with respect to any good. In
terms of demand, the property implies a progressive reaction to price movements: as the
price of a good increases, the optimal demand of that good decreases unit by unit.
By contrast, concavity is not required for the law of aggregate demand.
Theorem 12 If v is a class-substitute valuation that satisﬁes the consecutive-integer
property, then it satisﬁes the law of aggregate demand.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The class-substitute property and the law of aggregate demand do not imply the consecutive-
integer property. For example, in an economy with one good available in two units,
consider the non-concave valuation v(0) = 0, v(1) = 1, and v(2) = 4. v is trivially a
substitutes valuation, and satisﬁes the law of aggregate demand. However, at price p = 2,
the demand set is {0,2}, which violates the consecutive-integer property. This is also an
example of a class-substitute valuation that is not concave.
To obtain sharp results, we consider the concept of component-wise concavity, which
is weaker than concavity and entails diminishing marginal returns in each component
separately.
Definition 9 (Component-wise Concavity) A multi-unit valuation v is component-
15wise concave if for all x and k,
v(xk + 1,x−k) − v(x) ≥ v(xk + 2,x−k) − v(xk + 1,x−k).
Theorem 13 A multi-unit valuation v is submodular and component-wise concave if and
only if its binary form ˜ v = φ(v) is submodular.
Proof. By a theorem of Topkis (1998), it is suﬃcient to consider binary bundles x and y
that diﬀer in just two components. If the two components represent the same good, then
submodularity of the binary form is the same as component-wise concavity. If the two
components represent diﬀerent goods, then submodularity of the binary form is implied
by submodularity of the multi-unit form (and conversely). 
The last three properties listed in Theorem 11 describe the demands corresponding to a
unitary-substitute valuation in linear-pricing economies. Even though unitary-substitute
valuations are deﬁned by their demands in response to nonlinear prices, the identiﬁed
properties turn out to be suﬃcient to characterize unitary substitutes. That is the essen-
tial content of Theorem 14 below.
Before proving this theorem, we state a new “minimax” result, in which one of the choice
set is a lattice and the other choice set consists of nonlinear prices. The proof of this
result is in the Appendix.
If x is a multi-unit bundle and ˜ p is a nonlinear price vector, let (˜ p,x) denote the cost of







where ˜ pk(i) is the price of the ith cheapest unit of good k.
Proposition 1 (MiniMax) Suppose that v is a concave class-substitute valuation sat-
isfying the consecutive-integer property, and let ˜ p be a nonlinear price vector. Then,
max
x min
p {π(p) + px − (˜ p,x)} = min
p max
x {π(p) + px − (˜ p,x)}
Theorem 14 Let v be a multi-unit valuation. The following properties are equivalent.
(i) v is a unitary-substitute valuation.
16(ii) v is a concave class-substitute valuation, and satisﬁes the consecutive-integer prop-
erty.
Proof. We know from Theorem 11 that (i) implies (ii). We now show that (ii) implies (i).
From Theorem 2, it is enough to show that ˜ π is submodular. Consider any nonlinear price
vector ˜ p. We have
˜ π(˜ p) = max
˜ x
{˜ v(˜ x) − ˜ p˜ x} = max
x {v(x) − (˜ p,x)}.
Since v is concave, Theorem 1 implies that








{π(p) + px − (˜ p,x)}}.
From Proposition 1, the max and min operators can be swapped:
˜ π(˜ p) = min
p {max
x {π(p) + px − (˜ p,x)}} = min
p {π(p) + max
x {px − (˜ p,x)}}.





(pk − ˜ pki)+.
Therefore,








(pk − ˜ pki)+
)
.
Since v is a class-substitute valuation, π is submodular by Theorem 2. Moreover, the
function (x,y) → (x − y)+ is submodular as a convex function of the diﬀerence x − y.
Therefore, ˜ π(˜ p) is the minimum over p of an objective function that is submodular in p
and ˜ p, which shows that it is submodular in ˜ p.8 
It turns out that, given concavity and the class-substitute property, the law of aggregate
demand is equivalent to the consecutive integer property. Some of the main results above
are combined and extended in the following theorem.
Theorem 15 (Equivalence of Substitute Concepts) Let v be a multi-unit valu-
ation. The following statements are equivalent.
(i) v satisﬁes the binary single-improvement property.
(ii) v is a unitary-substitute valuation.
8See Topkis (1968).
17(iii) v is a concave class-substitute valuation and satisﬁes the consecutive-integer prop-
erty.
(iv) v is a concave class-substitute valuation and satisﬁes the law of aggregate demand.
(v) v is concave and satisﬁes the multi-unit single-improvement property.
Proof. (i) ⇔ (ii) is Gul and Stacchetti’s theorem (see Theorem 6). (ii) ⇔ (iii) is a
restatement of Theorem 14. Theorem 12 shows that (iii) implies (iv). For the converse,
the class-substitute property implies9 for all p that any edge E of D(p) has direction ei or
ei−αej for some goods i,j. In the ﬁrst case, concavity implies that all integral bundles on
the edge belong to the demand. In the second case, α = 1. Otherwise, slightly modifying
the price would reduce demand to that edge, and increasing pi if α > 1 or pj if α < 1
would violate the law of aggregate demand. This, along with concavity, implies that the
consecutive-integer property holds along all edges, and thus for D(p). (i)−(iv) implies (v):
(i) clearly implies the multi-unit single-improvement property, and (iii) implies concavity.
We conclude by showing that (v) implies (iii). We already know from Theorem 7 that
if v satisﬁes (v), then it is a class-substitute valuation. Therefore, there only remains to
show that v satisﬁes the consecutive-integer property. Suppose it doesn’t. There exists
a price vector p, a good k, and a unit number d such that Dk = {zk : z ∈ D(p)} is split
by d: the sets D
−
k = Dk ∩ [0,d − 1] and D
+
k = Dk ∩ [d + 1,Nk] are disjoint and cover
Dk. Now slightly increase pk. The new demand set D0 is such that D0
k ⊂ D
−
k . Pick any
bundle y that is optimal under the new price within the set {x ∈ X : xk ≥ d}. Then
yk > d, because pk has only been slightly increased and any bundle with d units of good
k was strictly dominated by D
+
k . At the new price, y is dominated but cannot be strictly
improved upon with reducing the amount of good k by at least two units, which violates
the single-improvement property. 
The multi-unit single-improvement property alone is not equivalent to unitary substitutes.
For example, in an economy with two goods available in two units, consider the valuation
v deﬁned by v(x) = kxk1 − .1r(x), where r(x) equals 1 if x contains exactly one unit
of each good, and 0 otherwise. The valuation is not concave, and therefore cannot be a
unitary-substitute valuation. However, one can easily verify that v satisﬁes the multi-unit
single-improvement property.
9See the proof of Proposition 1.
18We conclude this section with a property of concave, class-substitute valuations. For any
(multi-unit) bundle x, let P(x) denote the set of price vectors such that x ∈ D(p).
Theorem 16 If v is a class-substitute valuation, then for all x, P(x) is either the empty
set or the complete sublattice of P given by P(x) = argmin{π(p) + px}.
Proof. Fix x ∈ X. From Theorem 5,
v(x) ≤ min
p {π(p) + px}.
Suppose that the inequality is strict. Then v(x) − px < π(p) for all p, so P(x) is the
empty set. Now suppose that
v(x) = min
p {π(p) + px}.
Then, for all p ∈ argmin{π(p) + px},
v(x) − px = π(p),
so x ∈ D(p). Conversely, if x ∈ D(¯ p) for some price ¯ p, we have
argmin{π(p) + px} = v(x) = π(¯ p) + ¯ px.
Therefore,
P(x) = argmin{π(p) + px}.
From Theorem 2, π(p) is submodular. Therefore P(x) is the set of minimizers of a sub-
modular function over a sublattice P; hence, it is a sublattice of P. Completeness is
obtained by a standard limit argument. 
In the binary formulation, all bundles can be achieved through nonlinear pricing, by
setting some unit prices to zero and others to inﬁnity. Therefore, Theorem 16 takes a
simpler form. For any binary bundle ˜ x, let ˜ P(˜ x) denote the set of price vectors such that
˜ x ∈ ˜ D(˜ p).
Theorem 17 If ˜ v is a binary valuation satisfying the unitary substitutes, then ˜ P(˜ x) is a
complete, non-empty lattice for all ˜ x ∈ ˜ X.
Proof. For any bundle ˜ x, there exists a price ˜ p such that ˜ x ∈ ˜ D(˜ p). Therefore, ˜ P(˜ x) is
nonempty. The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 16. 
195 Aggregate Demand and Equilibrium Analysis
The ﬁrst theorem of this section extends results by Gul and Stacchetti and by Milgrom
asserting necessary conditions for the existence of Walrasian equilibrium in the binary
formulation. These theorems assume that individual valuations are drawn from a set that
includes all unit-demand valuations (Gul and Stacchetti), which are deﬁned next, or all
additive valuations (Milgrom).10 They establish that if the set of valuations includes any
that are not unitary substitutes, then there is a proﬁle of valuations to be drawn from
the set such that no competitive equilibrium exists.
These results are unsatisfactory for our multi-unit context, because they allow preferences
to vary among identical items and the constructions used in those papers hinge on that
freedom. The next theorem extends the earlier results by including the restriction that
ﬁrms’ binary valuations are consistent with some multi-unit valuation, that is, that ﬁrms
treat all units of the same good symmetrically.




k Nk denote the total number of units in the economy.
Theorem 18 Consider a multi-unit endowment X and a ﬁrm having a concave, class-
substitute valuation v1 on X that is not a unitary-substitute valuation. Then there ex-
ist I ﬁrms, I ≤ N, with unit-demand valuations {vi}i∈I, such that the economy E =
(X,v1,...,vI+1) has no Walrasian equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Since preferences are assumed to be quasi-linear, one can conveniently analyze equilib-
rium prices and allocations in terms of the solutions to certain optimization problems.
With that objective in mind, consider an economy consisting of n ﬁrms with valuations
{vi}1≤i≤n. The valuations vi are deﬁned for {x ∈ NK : xk ≤ Nk ∀k ∈ K}. It is convenient
to extend the domain of vi by setting v(x) = v(x∧(N1,...NK)) for all x in NK. We now









10An additive valuation is a valuation with the property that the value of any set is equal to the sum
of the values of the singletons in the set.
20and the market dual proﬁt function of the economy by
π(p) = max
x∈RK{v(x) − px}.
The function π is convex, as can be checked easily.

















which concludes the proof. 
Theorem 19 cannot be extended to nonlinear prices. To see this we observe, for example,
that the cheapest unit of a given good can only be allocated to a single ﬁrm when com-
puting the market dual proﬁt function, whereas it is included in all individual dual proﬁt
functions involving at least one unit of this good. It is thus easy to construct examples
where the market dual proﬁt function is strictly lower than the sum of individual dual
proﬁt functions, the latter allowing each ﬁrm to use the cheapest units.
Corollary 1 If all ﬁrms have class-substitute valuations, then the market valuation v
is also a class-substitute valuation.
Proof. If individual ﬁrms have substitute valuations, Theorem 2 implies that individual
proﬁt functions are submodular. By Theorem 19, the market dual proﬁt function is there-
fore a sum of submodular functions, and so itself submodular. Theorem 2 then allows us
to conclude that v is a substitute valuation. 
Definition 11 A price vector p is a pseudo-equilibrium price of the economy with en-
dowment ¯ x if
p ∈ argmin{π(p) + p¯ x}.
Sections 6 and 7 use the following characterization of pseudo-equilibrium prices.
Proposition 2 p is a pseudo-equilibrium price if and only if ¯ x is in the convex hull of
D(p).
21Proof. By deﬁnition p minimizes the convex function f : p → π(p) + p¯ x. Therefore, 0
is in the subdiﬀerential of f at p.11 That is, 0 ∈ ∂π(p) + ¯ x. The extreme points of ∂π(p)
are the opposite of bundles that are demanded at price p. Moreover, −D(p) ⊂ ∂π(p).
Therefore −Co(D(p)) = ∂π(p). Combining these results yields ¯ x ∈ Co(D(p)). 
Let P(¯ x) denote the set of pseudo-equilibrium prices.
Proposition 3 If all ﬁrms have class-substitute valuations, then P(¯ x) is a complete
sublattice of P.
Proof. Individual class-substitute valuations imply that πi is submodular for all i by
Theorem 2. Therefore, π is submodular. The proof is then identical to the proof of The-
orem 16. 
Theorem 20 The economy with endowment ¯ x has a Walrasian equilibrium if and only
if
v(¯ x) = min
p
{π(p) + p¯ x}.
Moreover, if the economy with endowment ¯ x has a Walrasian equilibrium, then the set of
Walrasian equilibrium prices is exactly the set P(¯ x) of pseudo-equilibrium prices.
Proof. Theorem 1 implies that v(¯ x) ≤ minp{π(x)+p¯ x}. Suppose that v(¯ x) = π(p)+px for
some p. Let ¯ xi denote the bundle received by ﬁrm i for some ﬁxed allocation maximizing
the objective in the deﬁnition of v. For all i we have
vi(¯ xi) − p¯ xi ≤ πi(p).
Summing these inequalities yields v(¯ x) ≤ π(p) − p¯ x. By assumption, the last inequality
holds as an equality, which can only occur if
vi(¯ xi) − p¯ xi = π(p)
for all i, implying that (p, ¯ x1,..., ¯ xn) is a Walrasian equilibrium.
To prove the second claim, suppose that ({¯ xi}1≤i≤n,p) is a Walrasian equilibrium. Then,
vi(¯ xi) = πi(p) + p¯ xi for all i. Summing these equalities yields v(¯ x) = π(p) + p¯ x, which
implies that v(¯ x) = minp{π(p)+p¯ x} (since the minimum is always above v(¯ x)). It is clear
from the ﬁrst part of the proof that if the economy has a Walrasian equilibrium, the set
11See for example Rockafellar (1970).
22of Walrasian prices is exactly the set of pseudo-equilibrium prices. 
Theorem 20 shows that whenever a Walrasian equilibrium exists, the concepts of pseudo-
equilibrium and equilibrium coincide. In binary economies, where nonlinear pricing is
available, the question of the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium have been solved by
Gul and Stacchetti (1999) and Milgrom (2000), who both show that equilibrium exists in
the binary formulation when goods are unitary substitutes and establish the two partial
converses described above.
For the multi-unit formulation, we have already established the partial converse in Theo-
rem 18. We now consider the other direction: we prove that unitary substitutes implies the
existence of a Walrasian equilibrium with linear pricing. This result is then used to prove
the stronger theorem that unitary-substitute valuations are closed under aggregation: if
all valuations satisfy unitary-substitutes, then so does the market valuation.
Theorem 21 (Linear-Pricing Walrasian Equilibrium) In a multi-unit exchange
economy with individual unitary-substitute valuations, there exists a Walrasian equilibrium
with linear prices.
Proof. Considering the binary form of the economy, Gul and Stacchetti (1999, Corollary
1) have shown that the set of (nonlinear pricing) Walrasian equilibria is a complete lattice.
In particular, it has smallest and largest elements. We now prove that these two elements
consist of linear prices, which proves the result. Suppose by contradiction that the largest
element ˜ p is such that ˜ pki 6= ˜ pkj for some units i, j of some good k. Then the price vector
˜ p0 equal to ˜ p except for units i and j of good k, where ˜ pki and ˜ pkj are swapped, is also
a Walrasian equilibrium. Therefore ˜ p ∨ ˜ p0 > ˜ p is also a Walrasian equilibrium, which
contradicts maximality of ˜ p. Linearity of the smallest element is proved similarly. 
Corollary 2 (Concavity of Aggregate Demand) In a multi-unit exchange econ-
omy with individual unitary-substitute valuations, the market valuation is concave.
Proof. Denote by x the total endowment of the economy, and n the number of ﬁrms.
We show that for all y such that 0 ≤ y ≤ x, there exists a linear price vector p such
that y is in the demand set of the market valuation. From Theorem 21, we already know
that the result is true if y = x. Thus suppose that y < x. Consider an additional ﬁrm
with valuation vn+1(z) = Kz ∧ (x − y), where K is a large constant, greater than the
total value of other ﬁrms for the whole endowment x. One can easily check that vn+1 is
23an assignment valuation, and therefore a unitary-substitute valuation (see Hatﬁeld and
Milgrom (2004)). Applying Theorem 21 to the economy with (n+1) ﬁrms, there exists a
Walrasian equilibrium with linear price vector p. At this price, the additional ﬁrm obtains
the bundle x−y since its marginal utility dominates all other ﬁrms’ for any unit up to this
bundle, and vanishes beyond this bundle. This implies that the remaining ﬁrms ask for y
at price p, or equivalently, that y belongs to the demand set of n ﬁrms’ market valuation
at price p. Concavity is then obtained as in the proof of Theorem 11. 
Theorem 22 (Aggregation) If individual ﬁrms have unitary-substitutes valuations,
then the market valuation v is a unitary-substitute valuation.








xi = x,xi ∈ N
)
.
From Theorem 14, we will prove the result if we show that v is a concave class-substitute
valuation that satisﬁes the consecutive-integer property. Corollary 2 states that v is
concave. From Corollary 1, v is a class-substitute valuation. It thus remains to show that
v satisﬁes the consecutive-integer property. For any price p, the demand set of v is the
solution of
max






















i Di(p). In particular, the projection of D on the kth coordinate
satisﬁes Dk =
P
i Di,k. The sets Di,k consist of consecutive integers by Theorem 11, im-
plying that Dk also consists of consecutive integers. 
Finally, we examine the connections between unitary-substitute valuations and the struc-
ture of the core of the associated cooperative game. The setting considered in this section
is the same as Ausubel and Milgrom (2002), but with the multi-unit formulation replacing
their binary formulation. We ﬁrst recall the deﬁnitions of coalitional value functions, the
core, and Vickrey payoﬀs.
Suppose that, in addition to bidders, there exists a single owner (labeled “0”) of all units
of all goods, who has zero utility for her endowment.









if 0 ∈ S, and w(S) = 0 otherwise.
Denote L the set consisting of all bidders and the owner of the good.
Definition 13 The core of the economy is the set
Core(L,w) =
(






πl for all S ⊂ L
)
.
Definition 14 The Vickrey payoﬀ vector (the payoﬀ at the dominant-strategy equilib-
rium of the generalized Vickrey auction) is
¯ πl = w(L) − w(L \ l)
for l ∈ L \ 0, and




Definition 15 The coalitional value function w is bidder-submodular if for all l ∈ L\0
and sets S and S0 such that 0 ∈ S ⊂ S0,
w(S) − w(S \ l) ≥ w(S
0) − w(S
0 \ l).
Theorem 23 Suppose that there are at least 2 + maxk Nk bidders. If any bidder has
a concave, class-substitute valuation that is not a unitary-substitute valuation, then there
exist linear or unit-demand valuations for remaining bidders such that the coalitional value
function is not bidder-submodular and the Vickrey payoﬀ vector is not in the core.
Proof. See the Appendix.
6 Walrasian Tˆ atonnement and Clock Auctions
This section analyzes auctions where goods are available in multiple units and prices are
linear. The goods are summarized by a vector ¯ x ∈ X = NK
++. We propose a class of
algorithms guaranteeing monotonic convergence of the auction to a pseudo-equilibrium
whenever bidders have class-substitute valuations. Combining that with the the results
25of Section 5 leads to the conclusion that if bidders have unitary-substitute valuations, the
auctions converge to a Walrasian equilibrium.
For the present analysis, we deﬁne a clock auction as a price adjustment process in which
the path of prices is monotonic—either increasing or decreasing. In practice this mono-
tonicity and other features, especially activity rules for bidders (see Milgrom (2000)),
diﬀerentiate clock auctions from a Walrasian tˆ atonnement. In order to understand the
relation between substitute valuations and clock auctions, it is useful to start the analysis
with Walrasian tˆ atonnement, and then draw implications of the corresponding results in
terms of clock auctions. We ﬁrst derive general results for an idealized economy with
prices changing continuously through time and where bidders submit their entire demand
set. We then show how the results apply to economies with a discrete price and time, and
where bidders only ask for one bundle at each stage of the auction.
6.1 Continuous time and price
There are n bidders with valuations {v1,...,vn} and a corresponding market valuation v.
At any time t, a price vector p(t) is posted. We limit attention to linear pricing. Each
bidder submits his demand set,12 resulting in an aggregate demand x(t) in the demand
set D(p(t)) of v.
The goal of this section is to construct algorithms that are monotonic and converge to a
pseudo-equilibrium. We focus on algorithms for which initial price is low, then increases
and converges to the smallest pseudo-equilibrium price p
¯
. Reverse algorithms, where price
decreases and converges to the largest pseudo-equilibrium price can be constructed in a
similar way.
We have seen that pseudo-equilibrium prices are the minimizers of the convex function
f : p → π(p) + ¯ xp. The most natural algorithms to ﬁnd such minimizers are steepest-
descent algorithms. At any time, price changes are determined by the gradient of f
whenever f is diﬀerentiable, and by the vector of smallest norm of its subdiﬀerential
otherwise.13 Such algorithms are particular Walrasian tˆ atonnement, as they adjust prices
12Later, we consider the case where the bidder only asks for a single bundle in his demand set.
13By deﬁnition, the subdiﬀerential ∂f(p) at p of a convex function f is the set of vectors x such that
f(q)−f(p) ≥ x(q −p) for all q. The subdiﬀerential is always a nonempty convex set, and coincides with
26so as to eliminate excess demand. Moreover, they follow the steepest descent and are
therefore particularly eﬃcient. For any price vector p, we denote by z(p) the point of
smallest norm in the opposite of the diﬀerential of f at p. When f is diﬀerentiable, z
corresponds to the excess (aggregate) demand D(p) − ¯ x. In general, z is the vector of
smallest norm in the convex hull of the set of excess demand. Intuitively, an algorithm is
a procedure that determines the evolution of price through time as a function of excess
demand D(p) − ¯ x and of time itself. In continuous time, an algorithm should thus be
deﬁned by a function F such that
˙ p(t) = F(D − ¯ x,t).
However, this deﬁnition is not appropriate in our setting, because F need not be con-
tinuous. The steepest-descent algorithm, in particular, follows discontinuous changes of
direction. In general, we will say that an algorithm is well-deﬁned if, from any initial
price, it generates a unique trajectory in the price space. The previous considerations
lead to the following deﬁnition.
Definition 16 A continuous, correspondence-based, steepest descent algorithm is deﬁned
by
˙ pr(t) = α(t,p(t))z(p(t)), (3)
where the subscript r denotes right derivative, the function α : (t,p) → α(t,p) is real-
valued and continuous, and takes values in [α
¯
, ¯ α] for some positive constants α
¯
< ¯ α.
Using right derivatives addresses discontinuities of z(p). The lower bound α
¯
ensures
that the algorithm does not stall at a suboptimal price, and the upper bound ensures
that that the equation is integrable. The following theorem states that, starting from any
suﬃciently low price, the algorithm is well deﬁned, monotonic and converges to the lowest
pseudo-equilibrium price, p
¯
. Let L = {p : p ≤ p
¯
and z(p) ≥ 0}.
Theorem 24 Any continuous, correspondence-based, steepest-descent algorithm is well
deﬁned. Suppose that bidders have class-substitutes valuations. For any such algorithm,
if p(0) ∈ L, then p(t) ∈ L for all t, p(t) is increasing and converges to p
¯
in ﬁnite time.
The proof is in the Appendix. Theorem 24 implies that, when bidders have class-substitute
valuations, any steepest-descent algorithm starting from low prices is an ascending clock
auction and converges to the smallest pseudo-equilibrium price. This result is important
f’s gradient whenever it is diﬀerentiable.
27in practice, and can be reformulated as follows. We deﬁne a continuous, correspondence-
based, ascending clock auction as a continuous, correspondence-based steepest-descent
algorithm, except that (3) is replaced by ˙ pr(t) = max{α(t,p(t))z(p(t)),0}.
Corollary 3 If bidders have class-substitute valuations, any continuous, correspondence-
based clock auction starting from a price in L converges to the smallest pseudo-equilibrium
price.
In particular, if goods are class substitutes, ascending clock auctions will ﬁnd an equilib-
rium whenever there exists one. By contrast, it is easy to build examples of valuations
violating class-substitutes such that a Walrasian equilibrium exists but ascending clock
auctions fail to ﬁnd it.
Our result extends Ausubel (2005), which proposes a similar algorithm when goods are
only available in one unit each. When goods are available in multiple units, the strat-
egy in earlier research has typically been to consider each unit as a distinct good. This
implies that the price of each unit evolves separately, which increases the complexity of
the auction proportionally to the number of units, compared to our algorithm. Moreover,
previous auction algorithms assumed what we earlier deﬁned as unitary-substitute val-
uations. Theorem 24 and its corollary show that class-substitute valuations are in fact
enough to guarantee monotonicity and convergence to a pseudo-equilibrium.
In theory, L depends on bidder valuations, which may see problematic, given that the
auctioneer does know them. In practice, the assumption p0 ∈ L means that the clock
auction can start at any price low enough to guarantee that there is excess demand in all
goods. This obviously includes zero initial prices, but also “reasonably low” reserve prices.
6.2 Discrete time and price
We now consider the case in which prices evolve on a grid. In such setting, it is natural
to consider discrete-time models, as nothing happens in any interval of time during which
prices remain constant. We thus consider a discrete time scale, where prices are adjusted
at each period.14 The ﬁrst goal of this section is to show that the results derived in the
previous section are approximately true, in the sense that trajectories obtained with dis-
14The lapse between two periods has no importance, and in fact could in principle vary during the
auction, possibly stochastically.
28cretized algorithms are very close to those generated by continuous algorithms, provided
that the price grid is thin enough. The second goal of the section is to show that the
algorithm still works if bidders only announce one desired bundle at each period, rather
than their entire demand set, consistent with what is observed in practice.
A price grid is a lattice Pη = (ηN)K, where η is a small positive constant. A discrete
algorithm generates a sequence of prices {pt : t = 0,1,...} in Pη, whose evolution is
determined by excess demand at any period. In a discrete setting, algorithms are always
well-deﬁned. A new issue is that price changes, which are restricted to a grid, may not be
able to follow exactly the gradient z. In general, vector directions can be approximated
up to the thinness of the grid, which can be arbitrarily small. The following lemma goes
further by showing that, provided the grid is thin enough, even the exact direction is
feasible. Following the previous section, we let z(p) denote the vector of smallest norm in
the convex hull of the excess (aggregate) demand set D(p) − ¯ x. The proof of the lemma
is in the Appendix.
Lemma 2 (Feasible directions of descent) Suppose that the number of bidders is
less than some constant N > 0, and that no bidder can demand more than overall supply
¯ x. Then, for any grid Pη, there exists α(η) > 0 such that α(η)z(p) ∈ Pη for all p and all
bidder valuations. Moreover, α can be chosen such that α(η) → 0 as η → 0.
In the rest of this section, we may therefore assume that the price grid is thin enough
for price changes to exactly follow steepest-descent directions and be arbitrarily small. In
order to stay exactly on the grid, we assume from now on that step sizes are integer mul-
tiples of α(η). Another issue is that discrete algorithms sometimes “overshoot”, meaning
that the discrete price sequence crosses a region boundary while the continuous algorithm
follows the boundary, causing the discrete algorithm to enter regions where some goods
are in excess supply, and where the algorithm gradient z, which is not continuous, takes
very diﬀerent values from the gradient of the continuous algorithm. The purpose of the
following lemma is to show that such overshoots are not important, as nearby trajecto-
ries of any discrete steepest-descent algorithm stay close to each other. Let {p(t)}t∈N and
{q(t)}t∈N denote the trajectories generated by a given steepest-descent algorithm, starting
from respective initial prices p(0) and q(0).
Lemma 3 (Nearness Lemma) Suppose that the number of bidders is less than some
constant N > 0, that no bidder can demand more than aggregate supply ¯ x, and that there
exists a vector M ∈ RK
+ such that bidders demand none of good i whenever pi > Mi.
29Then, for any ε > 0, there exists η > 0 and ¯ α > 0 such that for all grids thinner than η
and step size less than ¯ α, kp(0) − q(0)k < ε implies kp(t) − q(t)k < ε for all periods and
all bidder valuations.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The nearness lemma states that overshooting is not going to aﬀect the trajectory by
more than some arbitrarily small constant. This leads to the following theorem, which
states that the discrete algorithm essentially follows the continuous one. For any price
p0, denote by T(p0) = {p(t) : t ∈ R+,p(0) = p0} the trajectory generated by the con-
tinuous, correspondence-based steepest-descent algorithm of the previous section, and let
T(p0,ε) = ∪p∈T(p0)B(p,ε) denote the tube15 of radius ε around T(p0).
Theorem 25 (Discrete Steepest-Descent Algorithm) For any ε > 0, there ex-
ists η > 0 and ¯ α > 0 such that for any grid thinner than η, step size less than ¯ α, and initial
price p0, the trajectory generated by the discrete steepest descent algorithm is contained in
T(p0,ε).
Proof. Starting in the same region, trajectories of both algorithms are undistinguishable,
since they follow the same direction. Let t0 denote the ﬁrst time that the trajectory T
of the discrete algorithm overshoots, causing the two paths to have distinct vectors. Let
 > 0 be a positive constant (to be chosen later), and denote by pt0 the price of the discrete
algorithm, and by qt0 a price on T(p0) such that kpt0 −qt0k < . Such a price exists if the
step size ¯ α(), which gives an upper bound on the overshoot, is small enough. Let T1 de-
note the trajectory that the discretized algorithm would generate if it were starting from
qt0. By construction T1 coincides with T(p0) until there is a second overshoot. By the
nearness lemma, T and T1 are within ε from each other. Therefore, when T1 overshoots,
at time t1, there is a price qt1 of T(p0) such that kp(t1)−qt1k < 2. Iterating the process,
we thus prove that, up to the kth overshoot, we have T ⊂ T(p0,k) when T is truncated
at t = tk. The number of overshoots is bounded above by the number R of regions (since
any region is visited at most once by the continuous algorithm, see proof of Theorem 24).
Therefore, the result obtains by setting  = ε/R. 
As a by-product of Theorem 25, we can get rid at little cost of the assumption that bidders
submit their entire demand set. Bidder valuations can be seen as vectors of the ﬁnite-
dimensional space V = R¯ x. A property of an algorithm holds “for almost all economies”
15B(p,ε) is the open ball centered at p and radius ε.
30if it holds for all bidder valuations, except for a subset of Lebesgue measure zero of Vn,
where n is the number of bidders. A singleton-based steepest-descent algorithm, is the
same as the discrete steepest-descent algorithm, except that bidders ask only one bundle
at each period. Concretely, this means that instead of using the vector of smallest norm
of the excess demand set, the algorithm may follow any vector of that set. The following
result shows that this information loss does not aﬀect Theorem 25 except possibly on a
set of economies with Lebesgue measure zero.
Theorem 26 (Singleton-Based Algorithm) Under the assumptions of Theorem 25,
let p0 be any initial price of the algorithm. The trajectory of a singleton-based steepest-
descent algorithm is contained in T(p0,ε) for almost all economies.
The proof is based on the following proposition.
Proposition 4 For all (v1,...,vn) ∈ Vn, the demand correspondence p → D(p) is
single-valued almost everywhere in P with respect to the Lebesgue measure on this set.
Proof. We suppose ﬁrst that there is a unique bidder. For any two bundles x and x0, the
subset P(x,x0) of P deﬁned by P(x,x0) = {p : p(x−x0) = v(x)−v(x0)}, is the intersection
of a hyperplane with the positive orthant P, and has therefore zero Lebesgue measure.






which contains all prices at which the bidder’s demand is multi-valued, also has zero
Lebesgue measure. For a countable (in particular, ﬁnite) number of bidders, the set of
prices where aggregate demand is multi-valued is contained in Qa = ∪Qi, which has zero
Lebesgue measure. 
Proposition 4 implies that the set of economies such that Qa ∩Pη 6= ∅ has Lebesgue mea-
sure zero. Therefore, singleton-based and correspondence-based algorithms are identical
in almost all economies.
In practice, the auctioneer does not know bidder valuations. Theorem 26 implies that
for any belief that is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, the
algorithm is arbitrarily close to the continuous, correspondence-based steepest descent
algorithm of the ideal economy. In particular, the algorithm completely ignores bidders’
indiﬀerence sets. This feature contrasts with Gul and Stacchetti (2000), whose algorithm
gives much importance to indiﬀerence sets.
317 Pseudo-equilibrium as Approximate Equilibrium
In this section we derive some key properties of pseudo-equilibria, showing the importance
of the concept as an approximation of Walrasian equilibrium. For any good, bidder and
price, deﬁne
gi,k(p) = max{d : ∃(x,y) ∈ Di(p)
2 and yk − xk = d and @z ∈ Di(p) : zk ∈ (xk,yk)}.
Thus, gi,k(p) is the maximal gap in the bidder i’s demand for good k at price p. The
maximal gap in aggregate demand for good k at price p is deﬁned similarly and denoted
by gk(p). Finally, denote by γk(p) = maxi gi,k(p) the largest gap for good k for any bidder
i.
Lemma 4 For all k and p,
gk(p) ≤ γk(p).
Proof. Let Dk(p) denote the projection of aggregate demand on good k, and ¯ dk(p) denote
its maximum. We need to show that for all d ∈ Dk(p), such that d < ¯ dk(p) there exists
d0 ∈ Dk(p) such that 0 < d0 − d ≤ γk(p). By construction, there exists x and y in D(p)
such that xk =
P
i xi,k = d and yk =
P
i yi,k > d. This implies that there exists a ﬁrm i
such that yi,k > xi,k. By assumption, this implies that there exists a bundle zi in Di(p)
such that xi,k < zi,k ≤ xi,k +gi,k(p) ≤ xi,k +γk(p). The bundle z =
P
j6=i xj +zi is also in
D(p), and satisﬁes 0 < zk − xk ≤ γk(p). 
Now let γk = maxp{γk(p)}. This the maximum gap in demand for good k, over all bidders
and prices.
Theorem 27 For any pseudo-equilibrium price p and good k, there exists a bundle y ∈
D(p) such that
|yk − ¯ xk| ≤ γk.
Proof. By deﬁnition, a pseudo-equilibrium price p is such that ¯ x is in the convex hull of
D(p). In particular, there exist bundles x,y in D(p) such that xk ≤ ¯ xk ≤ yk. The result
then follows from Lemma 4. 
Thus we have a bound on excess demand or supply for good k. The next result uses
the following deﬁnition. For any positive, K-dimensional vector g and any bundle x, let
R(x,g) = {z : ∀k |zk − xk| ≤ gk} denote the hyperrectangle centered at x and with span
2gk along the kth coordinate.





Proof. Let m ∈ Q = Co(Di(p)). If m has integer coordinates, valuation concavity implies
that it belongs to Di(p). Suppose otherwise. There exists an integral vector (a,b) ∈ N2
such that m ∈ S = [a,a+1]×[b,b+1]. If any of the 4 integral vectors deﬁning S is in Di(p),
the claim is true. Otherwise, Q must cross S on two sides. This, along with convexity of
Q, implies that Q ∩ L is nonempty and contained in a slab of thickness strictly less than
1, where L is one of the four hyperspaces tangent to S. Suppose without loss of generality
that L = {x : x2 ≤ b}. Consider the set Λ = Di(p) ∩ L. If m / ∈
S
x∈Λ R(x,gi(p)), this
implies that projection of Di(p) on one of the two goods (depending on the orientation
of the slab) does not contain any element between mk and mk + εgi,k(p) where |ε| = 1,
which contradicts the deﬁnition of gi,k(p). 
Conjecture: the result may be true for all K if bidders have class substitute valuations.
Our goal is to show that, with enough control on individual demand functions, one can
bound the excess demand (or supply), over all goods at the same time, at any pseudo-





for all i and p. g represents some notion of coarseness of individual demands. The case in
which g is a vector of ones implies the consecutive-integer property, for which there is no
“hole” in the demand sets, and pseudo-equilibrium prices clear the market.16 The general
case is covered by the following theorem.
Theorem 29 If p is a pseudo-equilibrium price, there exists a bundle y ∈ D(p) such that
|yk − ¯ xk| ≤ min{K,n}gk
for all k.





i Co(Di(p)). There exist zi ∈ Co(Di(p)) such that ¯ x =
P
zi. By as-
sumption, there exists yi ∈ Di(p) such that |yi,k−zi,k| ≤ gk for all k. Letting y =
P
yi, we
have y ∈ D(p) and |¯ xk − yk| ≤ ngk. Now suppose that K < n. Since ¯ x ∈
P
i Co(Di(p)),
16In that case, the result is actually sharper than the statement of Theorem 29.
33the Shapley-Folkman theorem implies that there exist bundles zi ∈ Co(Di(p)) such that
¯ x =
P
zi and zi ∈ Di(p) except for i in some index subset J of cardinal weakly less than
K. For i ∈ J, there exists, by assumption, a bundle yi ∈ Di(p) such that |yi,k −zi,k| ≤ gk
for all k. Letting yi = zi for i / ∈ J, and letting y =
P
i yi, we have y ∈ D(p) and
|yk − ¯ xk| ≤ Kgk for all k. 
We conclude this section with two additional properties of pseudo-equilibria.
Proposition 5 Either the economy has a Walrasian equilibrium, or the set of pseudo-
equilibrium price vectors has measure zero.
Proof. If there does not exist any Walrasian equilibrium, the subdiﬀerential of f : p →
π(p)−p¯ x must be multi-valued at any pseudo-equilibrium price vector. Since f is convex,
the set of singular points has measure zero, which proves the result. 
Proposition 6 Suppose that bidders have concave valuations. If p is a pseudo-equilibrium
price vector at which at most one bidder has a multi-valued demand, then p is an equilib-
rium.
Proof. The aggregate excess demand set at p is a translation of the singled-out bidder’s
optimal demand at p. By concavity of that bidder’s valuation, the set must contain all
integer bundles in its convex hull, including zero. Thus, the supply vector is in the aggre-
gated demand set. 
8 Divisible Goods
For the case of divisible goods, the notions of unitary and class substitutes need to be
replaced. We instead use the concepts of linear and nonlinear substitutes. As the name
suggests, linear substitutes only considers linear price vectors and thus constitutes the nat-
ural extension of class substitutes to economies with divisible goods. Concave nonlinear-
substitute valuations possess many properties than one would expect from the extension
of the unitary substitutes concept, as shown in this section.
Definition 17 v is a linear-substitute valuation if whenever pj ≤ p0
j, pk = p0
k for all
k 6= j, and x ∈ D(p), there exists x0 ∈ D(p0) such that x0
k ≥ xk for all k 6= j.
34In the discrete case with individual item pricing, a rational consumer who buys k units
of some type of good always buys the cheapest k units. Therefore, one way to describe
individual item pricing is to specify that the cost of acquiring goods is a convex function
of the number of goods acquired from each class and is additive across classes of goods.
Higher prices mean that the marginal cost of acquiring additional units is higher. This
characterization of the cost of acquiring goods and the corresponding representation of
higher prices can be applied directly to the continuous case. That is the approach we
adopt in this section.
Let C1 denote the space of continuously diﬀerentiable, convex functions from R+ to R
which vanish at 0, and C = CK
1 . We endow C with the following partial order: C  ˆ C if
for all k, ck ≤ ˆ ck, where ck and ˆ ck are the derivatives of Ck and ˆ Ck, respectively. With
this order, C is a lattice, where for any C and ˆ C, the meet and the join satisfy, for all k
and xk ≥ 0, (C ∨ ˆ C)0
k(xk) = max{ck(xk),ˆ ck(xk} and (C ∧ ˆ C)0
k(xk) = min{ck(xk),ˆ ck(xk)},
respectively.17 We extend the domain of any dual proﬁt function π from linear prices to
C and denote ¯ π its extension:
¯ π(C) = max




Definition 18 v is nonlinear-substitute valuation if whenever Cj ≤ C0
j, Ck = ˆ Ck for all
k 6= j, and x ∈ D(C), there exists x0 ∈ D( ˆ C) such that x0
k ≥ xk for all k 6= j.
For the discrete case, we have seen that there are several properties distinguishing class
substitutes and unitary substitutes, so there is scope for judgment in creating the ana-
logue of unitary substitutes in the continuous case. For example, one could impose that
the extended concept satisfy the law of aggregate demand. That would require that a
dominant diagonal property hold for the matrix [∂xi/∂pj] of partial derivatives of demand.
The concept that we study below does not satisfy the law of aggregate demand.
In place of unitary substitutes, we study the concept of concave, nonlinear-substitute val-
uations. This deﬁnition preserves properties distinguishing unitary substitutes from class
substitutes in the discrete setting, including robustness of the substitutes property with
respect to nonlinear price changes and existence of Walrasian equilibria. Moreover, we
ﬁnd below that these valuations are characterized by dual submodularity on the domain of
17As can be easily checked, the marginal costs of (C∧ ˆ C)k and (C∨ ˆ C)k are continuous and nondecreasing
for all k, and constructed cost functions both vanish at 0, so that C ∧ ˆ C and C ∨ ˆ C belong to C.
35nonlinear prices, which was also the characterization of unitary substitutes in the discrete
case. We ﬁnd further that, given concavity, the linear-substitute and nonlinear-substitute
properties are equivalent. Therefore, our divisible-good extensions of the two concepts
coincide in the case of concave valuations. The next two theorems develop all of these
relationships.
Theorem 30 (Dual Submodularity) If v is a concave linear-substitute valuation,
then ¯ π is submodular on C.
Proof. We replicate the proof of Theorem 14. We use a modiﬁed version of Proposition 1,
whose proof is in the Appendix.




p {π(p) + px − C(x)} = min
p max
x {π(p) + px − C(x)}.
Given this result, we have18
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o
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We now show that the function h : (p,C) → h(p,C) =
R ∞
0 (p−c(z))+dz is submodular on
R+×C1. For q < r, h(r,C)−h(q,C) is the area of the region {(z,p) : p ∈ [q,r] and C(z) ≤
p}, which is also equal to
R r
q z(p,C)dp, where z(p,C) = sup{z : c(z) ≤ p}. Since z(p,C)
is nonincreasing in C for all p, so is h(r,C) − h(q,C), which proves submodularity of h.
Linear substitutes implies that π is submodular in p. Therefore, ¯ π is the minimum over
p ∈ P = RK
+ of an objective function that is submodular on P × C. A Topkis theorem
then implies that π is submodular on C. 
Theorem 30 allows us to prove the equivalence of three candidate deﬁnitions for the
divisible-good extension of unitary substitutes.
18See the proof of Theorem 14 for intermediary steps.
36Theorem 31 Suppose that v is concave. Then the three following statements are equiv-
alent.
(i) v is a linear-substitute valuation.
(ii) v is a nonlinear-substitute valuation.
(iii) π is submodular on C.
Proof. Clearly, (ii) implies (i). From Theorem 30, (i) implies (iii). To conclude the
proof, we show that (iii) implies (ii). We adapt the proof of Ausubel and Milgrom (2002),
Theorem 10. We ﬁx a direction of price increase for some good, and show that along
this direction, the demand for any other good is nondecreasing. Fix goods j 6= k and
a direction of increase δ (i.e. δ is nondecreasing convex and vanishes at 0) for good j.
Consider the function
π|2(λ,µ) = max
x {v(x) − C(x) − λxk − µδ(xj)}
deﬁned on R2
+. Since π is submodular, so is π|2. π|2 is convex as the pointwise max-
imum of a family of functions that are aﬃne in (λ,µ). In particular, ∂π|2/∂λ exists
almost everywhere. By an envelope theorem19 ∂π|2/∂λ exists everywhere that xk(λ,µ) is
a singleton and at those prices, ∂π|2/∂λ = −xk(λ,µ). Submodularity of π|2 implies that
∂π|2/∂λ(λ,µ) is nonincreasing in µ or, equivalently, that xk is nondecreasing in µ. 
Theorems 30 and 31 have an important consequence: concave nonlinear-substitute valua-
tions are stable under perturbation by any concave modular function. Thus comparative
statics results are robust with respect to such perturbations, as stated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 32 If v is a concave nonlinear-substitute valuation, then v + f is a concave
nonlinear-substitute valuation for all f modular and concave.
Proof. Suppose that v is a concave nonlinear-substitute valuation. Then, v+f is concave




x {v(x) + f(x) − px}.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that fi(0) = 0 for all terms of f. Let C(x,p) =
px−f(x). Since f is modular and concave, C is modular and for each i, Ci is convex and
19Milgrom and Segal (2002), Corollary 4.
37vanishes at 0. Therefore, C belongs to C. Moreover, increasing pk implies increasing Ck.
Since v is a nonlinear-substitute valuation and
x
f(p) = argmax
x {v(x) − C(x,p)},
x
f
j(p) is nondecreasing in Ck, thus in pk. 
We now turn to the consequences of the substitutes properties in settings with multiple
ﬁrms.
Repeating our previous analysis, we can show that the dual proﬁt function of a valuation
v is submodular over linear prices if and only if v is a linear-substitute valuation, and that
linear-substitute valuations are closed under aggregation. With divisible goods, concavity








xi ≤ x has a concave objective function and a convex constraint function, so
v is concave20 in the constraint bound x. This shows the following result, which extends
Theorem 22.
Theorem 33 Concave nonlinear-substitute valuations are closed under aggregation.
Proof. The above discussion shows that concave linear-substitute valuations are closed
under aggregation. This, along with Theorem 31, implies that the same is true of concave
nonlinear-substitute valuations. 
With divisible goods, concavity is a suﬃcient condition for the existence of a Walrasian
equilibrium. If, in addition, ﬁrms have nonlinear-substitute valuations, then the Vickrey
outcome is in the core.
Theorem 34 If all bidders have concave nonlinear-substitute valuations, the Vickrey out-
come is in the core.
Proof. From Theorem 7 of Ausubel and Milgrom (2002), it is enough to show that
the coalitional value function is bidder submodular. Therefore, we need to show that
w(S ∪ {l}) − w(S) is nonincreasing in S. Let x denote the quantity of goods available.
We have
w(S ∪ {l}) − w(S) = max
y≤x
{vl(x − y) + vS(y) − vS(x)},
20See for example Luenberger (1969, p.216).
38where vT(z) denote the optimal value of bundle z for coalition T. Therefore, it is enough
to show that vS(y) − vS(x) is non increasing in S or simply that vS(z) is submodular in
(−z,S). Concavity of vS
21 implies that
vS(z) = min
p {πS(p) + pz}, (4)
where πS is the dual proﬁt function of vS and is equal to
P
i∈S πi(p). Since π is submod-
ular in p, the objective in (4) is submodular in (−z,S,p). Hence, vS(z) is submodular in
(−z,S), as required. 
We have focused so far on monotone comparative statics of the demand function. In the
discrete case, we saw that unitary substitutes not only implied that xj is nondecreasing
in the (possibly nonlinear) price of other goods, but also that
P
j xj(˜ p) was nonincreasing
in ˜ p, which is the discrete law of aggregate demand. This property is no longer required
for several of the theorems pertaining to divisible goods, as Theorems 30 and 34 illustrate.
Might there be some analogue of the law of aggregate demand for divisible substitute
goods? One problem is to determine the units in which such a law might be expressed.
For example, if one unit of good i represents a 10-ride train pass between two cities,
while one unit of good j is a one-way bus ticket between the same cities. One expects
that, starting from prices where a consumer chooses the train pass, a large price increase
in the train pass results in the consumer buying several bus tickets to replace the train
pass, implying that the sum xi + xj increases as pi increases, which violates the law of
aggregate demand. One way to pose the problem without units is to ask whether there
exist constants ai such that
P
i aixi be nondecreasing in prices? In the previous example,
a natural choice would be ai = 1 and aj = 10, given the relative similarity of a train trip
and a bus trip. More generally, we say that a valuation v satisﬁes the generalized law of




is nonincreasing in C. It satisﬁes the law of aggregate demand if one can take fi(xi) = xi
for all i. The GLoAD seems so much more ﬂexible than the law of aggregate demand
that one is led to wonder whether it is satisﬁed by linear-substitute valuations, or at least
concave nonlinear-substitute valuations. However, the following theorem and its corollary
show that the GLoAD is equivalent to the law of aggregate demand up to a mere convex
21See discussion preceding Theorem 33.
39re-scaling of goods. For the remaining of this section we assume that the cost functions are
nondecreasing.22 To simplify the exposition, let ◦ denote the component-wise composition
of any function with any modular function: (f ◦ g)(x) = f(g1(x1),...,gK(xK)), for any
function f and modular function g. Clearly, f◦g is modular if f is also modular. Restricted
to the class of increasing modular functions, denote f−1 the component-wise inverse for




k (xk). For functions of one variable, these deﬁnitions
coincide with the usual ones.
Theorem 35 Let v be a concave nonlinear-substitute valuation satisfying the generalized
law of aggregate demand for some function f, and g be an increasing, concave, modu-
lar function. Then ˜ v = v ◦ g is a concave nonlinear-substitute valuation satisfying the
generalized law of aggregate demand for the modular function ˜ f = f ◦ g.
Proof. Since v and g are nondecreasing concave, so is ˜ v. Let ˜ C be a convex price
schedule, and y( ˜ C) = argmax ˜ v(y) − ˜ C(y). We wish to show that yj is nondecreasing in
˜ Ck for j 6= k, and that there exists an increasing modular function ˜ f such that ˜ f(y( ˜ C))
is nonincreasing in ˜ C. The function γ = g−1 is increasing, convex, and modular. By
assumption, there exists a modular function f such that f(x(C)) is nondecreasing in C,
where x(C) is the demand of v at the convex price schedule C. Let C = ˜ C ◦ γ. Since
all components of γ and ˜ C are nondecreasing convex, so are the components of C. In-
creasing ˜ Ck to ˜ C0
k is equivalent to increasing Ck to C0
k = ˜ C0
k ◦ γk. Therefore, if j 6= k,
yj( ˜ C) = γj(xj(C)) is nondecreasing when ˜ Ck increases. Moreover, letting ˜ f = f ◦ g, we
have ˜ f(y( ˜ C)) = f(x( ˜ C ◦ γ)), which is nonincreasing in ˜ C. 
Corollary 4 Suppose that v is a concave nonlinear-substitute valuation satisfying the
generalized law of aggregate demand for some convex function f. Then, ˜ v = v ◦ f−1
satisﬁes the law of aggregate demand.
Thus, the generalized law of aggregate demand corresponds to a quantitative rather than
a qualitative relaxation of the law of aggregate demand. In fact, it is possible to construct
a concave nonlinear-substitute valuation that does not satisfy any generalized law of
aggregate demand. We provide a sketch of this counter-example below, which establishes
a fundamental diﬀerence between the cases of discrete and divisible goods.
22This assumption if used in the proof of Theorem 35. We did not make this assumption earlier in
order to prove Theorem 32, where we consider C(x) = px − f(x) and f may be increasing.
40Counter-Example 2 There exist concave nonlinear-substitute valuations that do not
satisfy the generalized law of aggregate demand.
Proof. [Sketch] We consider the case of two goods. Let x < x0 and y < y0 be pos-
itive numbers, and consider the bundles A = (x,y), B = (x0,y), C = (x,y0), and
D = (x0,y0). If GLoAD held, there would exist some increasing functions f and g such
that f(x(p,q)) + g(y(p,q)) is nonincreasing in (p,q), where (p,q) is the price vector of
the two goods, and (x(p,q),y(p,q)) is the demand in the goods at that price. Suppose
that at B and C, a small increase in price p reduces x(p,q) by a very small amount
and increases y(p,q) by a very large amount (as in the ticket/pass example above). For
GLoAD to hold, this means that we must have f0(x0) much larger than g0(y) (looking at
B), and f0(x) much larger than g0(y0) (looking at C). Now suppose that A and D, a small
increase in price q reduces y(q) by a very small amount, and increases x(q) by a very large
amount. For GLoAD to hold, this means that we must have23 g0(y) much larger than
f0(x) (looking at A) and g0(y0) much larger than f0(x0) (looking at D). These two sets of
conditions are clearly incompatible, which shows that GLoAD cannot hold. To conclude
our counter-example, it remains to show that there exist concave nonlinear-substitute val-
uations satisfying the demand behavior described at points A,B,C,D. Demand variations
is determined by the Hessian of the valuation at these points. It is easy to choose Hes-
sian matrices that are negative deﬁnite, with negative cross derivatives and that satisfy
the requirements. We show that it is possible to extend these Hessian matrices over the
whole bundle space while keeping negative deﬁniteness and negative cross derivatives, by
superposition of several concave submodular functions. This deﬁnes a valuation (up to an
aﬃne term) that is submodular and concave. In two dimensions, submodularity implies
the linear-substitute property. By Theorem 31, the constructed valuation is therefore a
concave nonlinear-substitute valuation. 
9 Conclusion
The substitutes concepts play a critical role in equilibrium theory, particularly for discrete
economies. For discrete economies, the unitary substitutes conditions gives a necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for the robust existence of equilibrium and class substitutes drive
the monotonicity that is exploited by current auction algorithms. Unitary (respectively,
nonlinear) substitutes is also the condition that determines whether the Vickrey out-
23The proof is easily adapted if f and g are not diﬀerentiable at these points.
41come is in the core for economies with discrete (respectively, divisible) goods. A related
concept–the law of aggregate demand–has been the informal justiﬁcation for the wide
adoption of activity rules in practical auctions. Among our ﬁndings is that the law of
aggregate demand is precisely the additional property that converts a concave class sub-
stitute valuation to a unitary-substitute valuation when goods are discrete, but that this
diﬀerence vanishes when goods are divisible.
Our ﬁndings are also related to the literature on comparative statics in optimization.
Prior to our paper, “robust comparative statics” analysis has focused mainly on models
with complementarities, understood roughly as supermodularity of the objective. We
have shown that there are also robust comparative statics results for the case of nonlin-




Proof of Lemma 1. Consider a bundle x such that xk ≤ Nk−1 and xj ≤ Nj −2. Take
any binary representant ˜ x of x, and call l and m two units of good j not in ˜ x, and s a
unit of good k not in ˜ x. Since ˜ v satisﬁes the gross-substitute property, the set
{˜ v(˜ x+el+em)−˜ v(x+el)−˜ v(˜ x+em), ˜ v(˜ x+el+es)−˜ v(˜ x+el)−˜ v(˜ x+es), ˜ v(˜ x+em+es)−˜ v(˜ x+em)−˜ v(˜ x+es)}
has two or more maximizers. Symmetry of ˜ v implies that the last two arguments of that
quantity are equal, and therefore greater than or equal to the ﬁrst one. That is, written
in multi-unit form,
v(x + ek + ej) − v(x + ek) − v(x + ej) ≥ v(x + 2ej) − 2v(x + ej),
which, after simpliﬁcation, concludes the proof of Lemma 1. 
Proof of Theorem 12. Suppose by contradiction that the law of aggregate demand is
violated: there exist k, p and x such that for all ε small enough, we have (i) x ∈ D(p−εek),
and (ii) for all y ∈ D(p + εek), kyk1 > kxk1. Clearly, for any such y, we have yk < xk.
Let Dk = Dk(p), d
¯
= minDk and ¯ d = xk = maxDk. By continuity, we have (i) x ∈ D(p),




For each d ∈ Dk, deﬁne g(d) = min{ky−kk1 : yk = d and y ∈ D(p)}. Let γ : R+ → R
denote the largest convex function such that γ(d) ≤ g(d) for all d ∈ Dk. As can be easily
veriﬁed, γ is well deﬁned, and is piecewise aﬃne: there exists a partition ∆ = {δl}l∈Λ of
R+ such that γ is aﬃne on [δl,δl+1]. Moreover, ¯ d and d
¯
are elements of ∆: there exist
l
¯




and ¯ d = δ¯ l. For l ∈ {l
¯
+ 1,¯ l}, denote H(l) the hyperplane
containing the two (K − 2)-dimensional aﬃne varieties
{z ∈ R
K : kz−kk1 = γ(δl) and zk = δl}
and
{z ∈ R
K : kz−kk1 = γ(δl−1) and zk = δl−1}.
As the reader can verify, there exists a unique hyperplane containing these two aﬃne
varieties, so H(l) is well deﬁned. Moreover, H(l) lies below D(p) and contains at least
two elements z and y of D(p) such that zk = δl and yk = δl−1.
We claim that there exists l ∈ {l
¯
+1,¯ l} such that γ(δl−1)−γ(δl) > δl−δl−1. Suppose that
the contrary holds. Then, γ(d
¯




. But then, there exists y in D(p)
such that yk = d
¯
and ky−kk1 = γ(d
¯





which contradicts the hypothesized violation of the law of aggregate demand.
Consider an index l as in the previous paragraph, and modify p slightly so that the demand
set becomes D(p)∩H(l). As can be easily veriﬁed, the price vector can be further modiﬁed
so that the remaining bundles in the demand set are aligned on a unique straight line and,
for the new price ¯ p, there still exist z and y in D(¯ p) such that zk > yk and kzk1 < kyk1.
There are two cases: either there are two indices i and j such that yi > zi and yj > zj,
or there exists an index i such that yi − xi > xk − yk. Since optimal bundles are aligned,
the same properties hold for the extremities bundles of the segment containing D(¯ p), so
we assume without loss of generality that z and y are these extreme bundles. In the ﬁrst
case, increasing pi slightly violates the class-substitute property, as the optimal quantity
of good j also decreases. In the second case, the convex-demand property is violated: the
set Di(¯ p) contains a hole between zi and yi. 









{π(p) + px − (˜ p,x)}. (5)
43We need to prove that the reverse inequality also holds. We ﬁx ˜ p throughout the proof.
Consider a price p solving minp maxx{π(p)+px−(˜ p,x)}. Let N(p) = argmaxx{px−(˜ p,x)}.
By inspection, N(p) is a hyper-rectangle: there exist two bundles r and R with r ≤ R
such that N(p) = {z ∈ ZK : r ≤ z ≤ R}.
Suppose that there exists a bundle x in N(p) ∩ D(p). Then, the right-hand side of (5)
equals
π(p) + px − (˜ p,x) = v(x) − (˜ p,x),
where the last equality comes from the fact that x belongs to D(p). Now consider any
linear price vector q. We have π(q)+qx−(˜ p,x) ≥ v(x)−(˜ p,x), by deﬁnition of π(q). This
last inequality implies that the left-hand side of (5) is actually greater than or equal to its
right-hand side. Therefore, we will have concluded the proof if we show that N(p)∩D(p)
is nonempty, which we now turn to.
Let Co(D(p)) and Co(N(p)) denote the convex hulls of D(p) and N(p). We ﬁrst show
that Co(D(p)) ∩ Co(N(p)) has a nonempty intersection. Suppose by contradiction that
Co(D(p)) ∩ Co(N(p)) = ∅. Then, since these two sets are closed and convex, the
separating-hyperplane theorem implies that there exists a direction δ and a number a
such that yδ < a for y ∈ N(p) and xδ > a for x ∈ D(p). Now modify p by an
inﬁnitesimal amount along the direction δ, yielding a new level q = p + εδ. The ob-
jective function π(p) + maxz{pz − (˜ p,z)} is aﬀected by this change in two ways. First,
through the sensitivity of π with respect to p. Taking any x ∈ D(q) ⊂ D(p), we have
π(p) = v(x) − px and π(q) = v(x) − qx. Therefore, the change of π is −εxδ. Second,
through the sensitivity of maxz{pz−(˜ p,z)} with respect to p. There exists y ∈ N(p) such
that maxz{pz−(˜ p,z)} = py−(˜ p,y) throughout the price change. Therefore, the eﬀect on
this term equals εyδ. The overall change of the objective function is then ε(y − x)δ < 0,
implying that q leads to a strictly lower objective function than p, which contradicts op-
timality of p.
We have proved that the sets Co(D(p)) and Co(N(p)) have a non empty intersection. We
now prove that this intersection contains a point with integer coordinates. Consider any
polytope of RK. We say that an edge (i.e. a segment joining two vertices of the polytope)
is simply oriented if either (i) it is parallel to one coordinate axis {λei : λ ∈ R} of the
space or (ii) there exist two coordinates i and j such that the edge is parallel to ei−ej. We
say that a polytope is simply oriented if all its edges are simply oriented. Last, we recall
44that a polytope all of whose vertices have integer coordinates is called a lattice polytope.
Lemma 5 If a lattice polytope P is simply oriented, and H is the half space {x : xk ≥ q},
where k ∈ {1,...,K} and q is an integer, then P ∩H is either the empty set, or a simply
oriented, lattice polytope.
Proof. Suppose that Q = P ∩ H is nonempty. Then, it is a polytope. Its vertices are
either vertices of P, in which case they are integral, or new vertices belonging to H. We
prove that any such vertex also has integer coordinates. Any new vertex x is the inter-
section of H with an edge E of P that is not parallel to H. In particular, there exists an
integral vertex y of P such that x − y is parallel to E. Moreover, yk 6= q, since the edge
is not parallel to H. The edge is either parallel to ek or to ek − ei for some i 6= k. In the
ﬁrst case, we have xj = yj ∈ Z for all j 6= k and xk = q ∈ Z, so x has integer coordinates.
In the second case, xj = yj ∈ Z for all j / ∈ {i,k}, xk = q ∈ Z, and xi = yi +(yk −xk) ∈ Z,
so x also has integer coordinates. We now prove that the edges of Q are simply oriented.
Thus consider an edge E of Q, joining vertices x and y. If either x or y are vertices
of P, then E is either an edge of P, or the result of such an edge being cut by H. In
either case, it is simply oriented because P is simply oriented. If both x and y are new
vertices, E is the intersection of a two-dimensional face F of P with H, where F is not
parallel to H. F is deﬁned by two linearly independent edges E0 and E00 of P which are
simply oriented, and at least one of which contains ek. Suppose ﬁrst that either E0 or E00,
say E0, is orthogonal to ek. Then it is easy to show that E is parallel to E00 and there-
fore simply oriented. Now suppose that both E0 and E00 have a nonzero kth component.
Because they are linearly independent, there exist i and j such that F is generated by
ek − ei and ek − ej (where the signs come from the fact that P is simply oriented). In
that case, as can be easily veriﬁed, E is parallel to ei−ej, and therefore simply oriented.
We observe that Lemma 5 still holds if the inequality sign is reversed in the deﬁnition of H.
Co(D(p)) is a lattice polytope since D(p) consists of integral vectors. We now prove that
Co(D(p)) is simply oriented. Thus consider any edge E of Co(D(p)). There exists a
vector δ of RK such that E is included in some straight line ∆ = {x0 + λδ}λ∈R. We ﬁrst
show that δ has at most two nonzero components. Suppose on the contrary that δ has at
least three components, say i, j, and k. Without loss of generality assume that δi and δj
are positive. Since E is a face of Co(D(p)), there exists an inﬁnitesimal modiﬁcation of
the price vector p, such that D(p) = E. Moreover, E contains two vectors x and y such
that x − y = λδ for some λ > 0. If we slightly increase pi, x becomes suboptimal, so the
45optimal quantity of good j decreases, which violates the class-substitute property. Thus,
δ has at most two nonzero components. We now prove that E is simply oriented. If δ
has only one nonzero component, the claim is trivial. Suppose that δ has two positive
components, say i and j. We show that δi = −δj. Since E has integer vertices, we can
assume that δi and δj are integers.24 If δiδj > 0, slightly increasing pi reduces the optimal
quantity of good j which violates the class-substitute property. Thus, δi and δj have
opposite signs. Now suppose that |δi| < |δj|. This implies that for all integral vectors x
and y in E, we have |xj −yj| ≥ 2, which violates the consecutive-integer property. Thus,
δi = −δj, which concludes the proof.
We have shown that Co(D(p)) is a simply oriented lattice polytope. Since Co(N(p)) is a
hyperrectangle of the form {x ∈ RK : a ≤ x ≤ b} for some integral vectors a and b, we
have, denoting H(k,q)+ = {x : xk ≥ q} and H(k,q)− = {x : xk ≤ q},




Iterating Lemma 5 2K times implies that Co(D(p)) ∩ Co(N(p)) is either the empty set
or a lattice polytope. Since we have already shown that this intersection is nonempty, it
must contain an integral point, which concludes the proof of Proposition 1. 
10.2 Section 5
Proof of Theorem 18. We extend part of the proof of Theorem 2 in Gul and Stacchetti
(1999) to a multi-unit context. By assumption, there exist a price vector ¯ p, a good k, and
bundles x and x0 such that (i) {x,x0} ∈ D(¯ p), (ii) x0
k − xk ≥ 2, and (iii) for all z in D(¯ p),
zk / ∈ (xk,x0
k). This implies that at the price p = ¯ p − ηek, x is only dominated by bundles
z such that zk ≥ xk + 2. In particular, the single-improvement property is violated by x








satisﬁes yk ≥ xk + 2.
24See for example Korte and Vygen (2000).
46Let ρ =
P
j(yj−xj)+. By hypothesis, ρ ≥ 2. Let ε =
u1(y,p)−u1(x,p)
2ρ . Let I+ = {j : xj < yj},
I− = {j : xj > yj}, and I0 = {j : xj = yj}. If j ∈ I+, introduce Nj − yj ﬁrms, call them
“Cj”, with unit-demand valuation v1(X) + 2 for a single unit of good j. If j ∈ I+ \ {k},
introduce yj −xj ﬁrms, call them “cj”, with unit-demand valuation pj +ε for a single unit
of good j. If j = k, introduce yk −xk −1 ﬁrms (“ck”) with unit-demand valuation pk +ε
for a single unit of good k. If j ∈ I−, introduce Nj − xj ﬁrms (Cj) with unit-demand
valuation v1(X) + 1 for a single unit of good j, and xj − yj ﬁrms (cj) with unit-demand
valuation pj for a single unit of good j. If j ∈ I0, introduce Nj−xj ﬁrms with unit-demand
v1(X) + 1. Last, introduce a special ﬁrm, “ﬁrm 2”, with unit-demand pk + v1(X) + 1 for
a single unit of good k.
Now suppose that there exists a Walrasian equilibrium with price vector t, and let Xi
denote the bundle of the equilibrium received by ﬁrm i. Necessarily, (X1)j ≥ min{xj,yj}
for all j, since even if all unit-demand ﬁrms get one unit, there remain min{xj,yj} units
of good j. Deﬁne a new price vector as follows: qj = tj for j / ∈ I− and qj = pj for j ∈ I−.
For j ∈ I−, Nj − xj units go to ﬁrms Cj. The remaining xj units are shared between
ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrms cj, with at least yj units for ﬁrm 1. Now, if ﬁrm 1 has none of the
remaining xj − yj units, it means that tj ≤ pj, and this share remains optimal when tj is
increased to pj. If ﬁrm 1 has all of the remaining units, it means that tj ≥ pj, and this
share remains optimal when tj is decreased pj. If ﬁrm 1 has only a part of these remaining
units, it means that tj is already equal to pj. Thus (X,q) is also a Walrasian equilibrium,
such that X1 ≥ x ∧ y. Moreover, all Cj get their units, so that X1 ≤ x ∨ y. Therefore
x ∧ y ≤ X1 ≤ x ∨ y. (6)
Firm 2 necessarily gets a unit of good k ∈ I+. Therefore, X1k < yk. This, together
with (6), implies that
P
k |xk − X1k| <
P
k |xk − yk|, and thus
u(X1,p) ≤ u(x,p). (7)
Suppose that there exist some goods j in I+ such that X1j > xj. This implies that
qj ≥ pj + ε, since ﬁrms cj would otherwise want to get all the units. Combining these
price inequalities with (7) yields u1(X1,q) < u1(x,q), which contradicts optimality of X1
for ﬁrm 1.
Suppose instead that X1j ≤ xj for all j. Then, all units between xj and yj for j ∈ I+ are
consumed by ﬁrms cj and by ﬁrm 2. For j 6= k, this implies that cj have a positive value
for the good: qj ≤ pj + ε. For j = k, even though ﬁrm 2 takes one units of the yk − xk
47available units of k, the fact that yk ≥ xk + 2 implies that there is also a ﬁrm ck taking
one unit of good k, which implies that qk ≤ pk + ε. Since X1 = x on I+ and pj = qj for
j / ∈ I+, (7) implies
u1(X1,q) ≤ u1(x,q).
Since qj ≤ pj + ε for all j ∈ I+, the value initially chosen for ε implies that u1(x,q) <
u1(y,q), and thus u1(X1,q) < u1(y,q), which contradicts optimality of the bundle X1 for
ﬁrm 1. 
Proof of Theorem 23 From A&M Theorem 7 (which allows for multiple units of
goods), we know that the vector of Vickrey payoﬀ vector is in the core if and only if the
coalitional value function is bidder-submodular. We show that under the assumptions of
Theorem 23, there always exist bidder valuations such that the coalitional value function is
not bidder-submodular. Suppose that bidder 1’s valuation violates the consecutive-integer
property. There exist ˆ p and k such that Dk(ˆ p) does not consist of consecutive integers.
Let p = ˆ p+εek for ε small enough. Then there exists x and z such that xk ≥ zk +2, and
v(z) − pz > v(x) − px > v(y) − py (8)
for all y such that yk ∈ (zk,xk). Introduce a second bidder with linear valuation v2(x) =
p−kx−k, and xk − zk unit-demand bidders who only value good k. The total number of
bidders is xk − zk + 2 ≤ Nk + 2 ≤ maxk Nk + 2. From (8), we have
v(x) + p−k(¯ x − x)−k ≥ v(y) + p−k(¯ x − y)−k + pk(xk − yk)
whenever xk − yk ≤ xk − zk − 1, and
v(z) + p−k(¯ x − z)−kpk(xk − zk) > v(x) + p−k(¯ x − x)−k.
Therefore, denoting S the set consisting of bidders 1, 2 and the xk − zk − 2 unit-demand
ﬁrms, and s and t the last two unit-demand bidders, we have
w(S ∪ {s}) = w(S)
and
w(S ∪ {s,t}) > w(S ∪ {t}),
which implies that w is not bidder-submodular. 
4810.3 Section 6
Proof of Theorem 24. The proof is based on three lemmas, proving respectively
well-deﬁnedness, monotonicity, and conﬁnement in L.
Lemma 6 (Well-definedness) The continuous SDA algorithm is well deﬁned.
Proof. On any region of the price space where excess demand is constant, the algorithm
deﬁnes a straight trajectory of direction z, and is thus well-deﬁned.25 The only possible
problem, thus, is to rule out the possibility that there are inﬁnitely many region changes
in an arbitrarily small amount of time. With the steepest-descent algorithm, the norm of
z is nondecreasing in time. Since z is constant over any region where aggregate demand
is constant, and the norm of z strictly decreases each time it changes, any region that is
left is never visited again. 
Lemma 7 (Monotonicity) When bidders have class-substitute valuations and z(0) ≥
0, p(·) is nondecreasing.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that z(t) fails to be nonnegative at some time t, and
take the smallest such time. Since z(0) ≥ 0, t > 0. By construction, z(s) ≥ 0 on a
left neighborhood of t. Let m = z(t), x = z(t−), and P be the opposite of the subdif-
ferential of f at p(t). P is a convex polytope, whose vertices are elements of the excess
demand at p(t), and m is the element of P with smallest norm. By assumption, x is
nonnegative. By continuity of demand, x must also belong to P. Let J = {k : mk < 0}.
By assumption, J 6= ∅. Let H be the aﬃne hyperplane going through (the point) m
and orthogonal to (the vector) m. By assumption, P is on one side of H and touches
H at m. Let F be the largest face of P contained in H, y be any vertex of F, and
Cy = {z :
P
J mkzk ≥ kmk2 −
P
Jc msys}. Since y − m is orthogonal to m, Cy is a cone
with vertex y. We will show that Cy contains P but not x, a contradiction.




J mkyk = mJyJ, where the
components of mJ are equal to those of m on J and vanish on Jc, and a similar deﬁnition
for yJ. By convexity of F, m = y +
P
l αlEl, where {El} is the family of direction vectors
of the edges of F emanating from y. Taking the scalar product of the previous equality
with mJ yields mmJ = yJmJ +
P
l αlElmJ. We now prove that ElmJ = 0 for all l. By
25The scalar function α is immaterial, as long as it is bounded away from 0 and +∞.
49construction of F,
m.El = 0. (9)
Moreover the class substitute property implies that El has at most two nonzero compo-
nents, and any two nonzero components are of opposite sign (see the proof of Propo-
sition 1). If El has one nonzero component, it must be in Jc, otherwise it would vio-
late (9). If it has two nonzero components, then either they are both in J or both in
Jc, for otherwise (9) would be violated. In any case, this implies that El.mJ = 0. Thus,
mJvJ = m2
J > 0. In particular Cy = {z :
P
J mkzk ≥ m2
J}. Since the components of x
are nonnegative by construction, x cannot belong to Cy.
To conclude the proof, we show that Cy contains P. By convexity of P, it is enough to
show that all edges of P emanating from y are going in the cone Cy. This will be the case
if we show that for any such edge with direction δ (away from y), we have
δmJ ≥ 0. (10)
By deﬁnition of F, we have δm ≥ 0 (i.e. any edge from y must point outwards from H).
Since bidders have class-substitute valuations, δ has at most two nonzero components.
Suppose ﬁrst that it has exactly two components, δi and δj. If i,j are in J, then (10)
trivially holds. If i,j are in Jc, then (10) is an equality. If i ∈ J and j ∈ Jc, then δm ≥ 0
and the fact that δiδj < 0 (by class-substitutes) implies that δi < 0, and thus that (10)
holds. If there is only one nonzero component, (10) holds trivially. 
Lemma 8 (Confinement) If bidders have class-substitute valuations, p(0) ≤ p
¯
and
z(0) ≥ 0, then p(t) ≤ p
¯
for all t ≥ 0.
Proof. Suppose not: there exists a time t such that p(t) crosses the hyperrectangle
R = {z : z ≤ p
¯
} from inside out. In particular, the index subset I = {j : pj(t) = p
¯
j}
is nonempty, and we have pj(t) < p
¯
j for j / ∈ I. Moreover, p(s)  p
¯
for s in a right
neighborhood of t: there exists a nonempty subset J ⊂ I such that ps,j > p
¯
j for j ∈ J
and s ∈ (t,t + ε). By construction of the algorithm, this means that the vector n of
smallest norm in the opposite of the subdiﬀerential of p(t) satisﬁes nj > 0 for j ∈ J.
We will contradict this statement by showing that the vector m deﬁned by mj = nj for
j / ∈ J and mj = 0 for j ∈ J is in the opposite of the subdiﬀerential. m’s norm is strictly
smaller than n’s, contradicting the assumption that n is of smallest norm in the opposite
of the subdiﬀerential. By deﬁnition of the subdiﬀerential, we need to show that, letting
50p = p(t),
m(q − p) ≥ f(p) − f(q) (11)
for all q. We ﬁrst show this inequality in a neighborhood of p. By construction of n,
n(q − p) ≥ f(p) − f(q)
for all q. Therefore, (11) is automatically satisﬁed for q such that qj ≤ pj for j ∈ J.
Now consider the case where qj > pj for a subset J(q) of J. Consider the vector q0 such
that q0
j = qj for j / ∈ J(q) and q0
j = pj for j ∈ J(q). Since we are in a neighborhood of
p, qj ≤ p
¯
j for all j / ∈ J(q). This implies that q0 ≤ p
¯
and, therefore, that q0 = q ∧ p
¯
. By
submodularity of f, we have
f(p
¯
∧ q) + f(p
¯
∨ q) ≤ f(p
¯
) + f(q).
The inequality, combined with the fact that p
¯
is a minimum of f, implies that f(q0) ≤ f(q).
By construction of q0, we have
m(q − p) = m(q
0 − p) ≥ n(q
0 − p) ≥ f(p) − f(q
0) ≥ f(p) − f(q),
which concludes the proof on a neighborhood of p. To prove the result globally, consider
any vector q and let qλ = λq + (1 − λ)p where λ ∈ (0,1). From the previous analysis we
have, for λ small enough,
m(qλ − p) ≥ f(p) − f(qλ).
By convexity of f,
f(qλ) ≤ λf(q) + (1 − λ)f(p).
Combining the previous two inequalities and dividing by λ yields the result. 
We now conclude the proof of the theorem. Since p(t) is nondecreasing and bounded, it
must converge to some limit in L. Since α is bounded away from zero, the rate of change
of p is bounded away from zero on any closed subset of the price space that does not
contain any pseudo-equilibrium price. Since the only pseudo-equilibrium price contained
in L is p
¯
, this has to be the limit.
Proof of Lemma 2. By assumption, the excess demand set is an integer polytope
of RK, bounded by the rectangle [−¯ x,N¯ x]. Therefore, z can only take ﬁnitely many
values. Since any such z is the vector of minimum norm of an integral polytope, it has
rational coordinates. Therefore, its direction can always be achieved on regular lattice.
51That is, there exists a positive number α(z) such that α(z)z is a feasible direction of the
lattice. Moreover, α(z) gets arbitrarily small as the grid gets arbitrarily thin. Since there
are ﬁnitely many values of z, maxz{α(z)} goes to zero as the grid thinness η goes to zero.
Proof of Lemma 3. Without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to price
vectors less than M. Since the number of bidders is ﬁnite, the function f : p → π(p)+ ¯ xp
is piecewise aﬃne, with ﬁnitely many regions. Moreover, directions of the hyperplanes
supporting f are determined by excess demand vectors, which take ﬁnitely many values
(cf. proof of Lemma 2). Since z is in the opposite of the diﬀerential of f, we have
f(q) − f(p) ≥ z(p)(p − q)
for all q, with strict inequality if p and q are in distinct regions. The fact that p is
bounded by M and that there are ﬁnitely many possible slopes for f implies the existence
of a constant ρ > 0 such that
f(q) − f(p) ≥ ρ + z(p)(p − q) (12)
whenever p and q are not in the same region. We now consider paths of the discrete
steepest-descent algorithm starting from respective initial price vectors p0 and q0, with
kp0 − q0k < ε. Trajectories are parallel until the two prices reach diﬀerent regions, and
thus leave the vector pt − qt unchange until that time. Let s ≥ 0 denote the ﬁrst time
that the two paths hit distinct regions. From (12), we have,
f(qs) − f(ps) ≥ ρ + z(ps)(ps − qs)
and
f(ps) − f(qs) ≥ ρ + z(qs)(qs) − ps).
Summing these inequalities yields26
(z(ps) − z(qs))(ps − qs) ≤ −2ρ
Let α be the step size27 of the steepest-descent algorithm: ps+1 = ps + αz(ps), and
qs+1 = qs + αz(qs)
kps+1 − qs+1k
2 = kps − qsk
2 + kα(z(ps) − z(qs))k
2 + 2α(z(ps) − z(qs)) · (ps − qs).
26This proof strategy introduces a strict version of the theory of maximally monotone mapping. See
Rockafellar (1970).
27The result holds if α depends on t and p, as long as it is continuous in p.
52Therefore,
kps+1 − qs+1k
2 − kps − qsk
2 ≤ −4ρα + O(α
2),
which is negative for α small enough, which we impose by appropriately setting ¯ α. Thus,
we have proved that kpt − qtk remains constant when prices are in the same region, and
decreases otherwise. 
10.4 Section 8
Proof of Proposition 7.
We adapt the proof of Proposition 1. Let p denote any solution of minp maxx{π(p)+px−
C(x)}. With divisible goods and concave demand, Co(D(p)) = D(p) (closedness of D(p)
is guaranteed by continuity of the objective function v(x) − px) and Co(N(p)) = N(p)
where N(p) = argmaxx{px − C(x)} (closedness of N(p) is guaranteed by continuity
of the cost function). Therefore, it is enough to show that Co(D(p))
T
Co(N(p)) 6= ∅.
Suppose otherwise. Since these two sets are closed and convex, the separating-hyperplane
theorem then implies the existence of a direction δ and a number a such that yδ < a
for y ∈ N(p) and xδ > a for x ∈ D(p). Now modify p by an inﬁnitesimal amount
along the direction δ, yielding a new level q = p + εδ. For pλ = (1 − λ)p + λq, let
g(pλ) = π(pλ) + maxz{pλz − (˜ p,z)}. By the integral form of the envelope theorem (see
Milgrom and Segal (2002)),







where x(λ) is any element of D(pλ) and y(λ) is any element of N(pλ). Since objec-
tive functions are continuous, Berge’s theorem implies that for ε small enough, x(λ)δ
is uniformly strictly above a and y(λ)δ is uniformly strictly below a. This implies that
g(q) < g(p), which contradicts optimality of p. Therefore, D(p)∩N(p) has a nonempty in-
tersection. The rest of the proof is identical to the ﬁrst part of the proof of Proposition 1.
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